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ARTICLE 
TAKING DISABILITY PUBLIC 
JASMINE E. HARRIS† 
Antidiscrimination laws enforce the idea that no one should be forced or 
encouraged to hide their race, gender, sexuality, or other characteristics of their 
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identity. So why is disability rights law the glaring exception? Other areas of 
antidiscrimination law have eschewed forms of enforced privacy about protected 
classes and, as a result, challenge privacy norms as problematic, anti-agentic, and, 
at times, counter to structural reform goals. In contrast, disability rights law values 
privacy norms to preempt discrimination; in other words, if you never reveal the 
information, no one can discriminate against you because of that information. This 
Article argues that this is a mistake, and that to truly discard stigma and false notions 
of disability as synonymous with incapacity, we need to fundamentally challenge and 
reconceive of how privacy applies to disability identity, legal status, the law’s remedial 
role and, in some settings, redesign legal interventions to incentivize publicity values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disability law has a complicated relationship with privacy.1 A central 
normative assumption is that, whenever possible, information related to 
disability should be kept confidential to avoid discrimination.2 
Antidiscrimination law and society have expressed a preference for privacy in 
the disability context. As a result, laws in this area often reinforce disability 
as a private, undesirable fact, and regulate its disclosure. In contrast, the 
relationship between privacy and publicity is more nuanced in other areas of 
antidiscrimination law. For example, the law is neutral on the position of 
whether an individual capable of concealing their Blackness ought to favor 
disclosure or nondisclosure.3 Partly a function of an accepted (albeit 
problematic) view that people can “see” race, many Black people lack the 
 
1 “Privacy” here includes primarily informational and bodily, intellectual, spatial, decisional, 
communicational, associational, proprietary, and behavioral privacy. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton 
Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 566-69 (2017). Privacy, as I argue in this Article, has individual and collective 
properties. See infra Part I. Scholars continue to debate existing and normative boundaries of 
“privacy.” See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490–91 (2006) 
(organizing privacy into four main categories and subcategories: (1) information collection 
(including surveillance); (2) information processing (including identification, insecurity); (3) 
information dissemination (breach of confidentiality, disclosure, appropriation, distortion); and (4) 
invasion (intrusion, overreaching, decisional interference)). This Article recognizes the theoretical 
and utilitarian complexities of this debate, but advancement of a normative position on the 
epistemological nature of privacy is beyond the scope of this paper. I assume privacy (and the rights 
and responsibilities that attach) is context-dependent and varies accordingly. 
2 People with more visible disabilities often do not have the luxury of wrestling with the 
question of disclosure because they visibly exhibit markers of disability, what I call the “aesthetics 
of disability” in a prior theoretical account. See generally Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (2019). “Discrimination” here refers to differential treatment based on 
protected identity characteristics and not positive or neutral instances of socially/legally acceptable 
differential treatment such as differential treatment based on age that limits access to voting or, 
more mundanely, alcohol consumption. 
3 Society’s preferences for “whiteness” and related performances of “whiteness” do nudge those 
capable of passing or covering race to do so. The point here is that disability law takes a notable 
normative position on disclosure. 
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choice of whether or not to claim Blackness.4 As a result, Black people might 
make different choices along a privacy–publicity continuum depending on 
the extent to which they manifest visible markers of difference. 
Disability identity, however, finds itself clustered at the extreme privacy 
end of the same continuum. Disability laws nudge those capable of doing so 
toward passing or covering their less visible disabilities. While there are 
certainly benefits to disability law’s preference for privacy—most notably, 
avoiding discrimination based on antiquated biases about disability—this 
strong privacy norm also has costs which we have not fully considered. For 
example, disability is also a sociopolitical identity with increasing salience in 
contemporary political discourse and a growing voting bloc courted by 
political actors.5 
This Article challenges this principal normative assumption in disability 
law that privacy best serves both individual and structural antidiscrimination 
goals.6 I argue that a preference for privacy-enforcing norms in disability law 
 
4 Of course, skin color and other aesthetic markers associated with “Blackness” also exist along 
a continuum relative to perceived “whiteness.” Like people with less apparent disabilities, those with 
lighter skin color may be faced with opportunities for claiming “Blackness.” As Professor Lori 
Tharps has argued: 
In the 21st century, as America becomes less white and the multiracial community—
formed by interracial unions and immigration—continues to expand, color will be 
even more significant than race in both public and private interactions. Why? Because 
a person’s skin color is an irrefutable visual fact that is impossible to hide, whereas race 
is a constructed, quasi-scientific classification that is often only visible on a 
government form. 
Lori L. Tharps, The Difference Between Racism and Colorism, TIME (Oct. 6, 2016, 3:49 PM), 
https://time.com/4512430/colorism-in-america [https://perma.cc/BA4Q-XVVA]. 
5 See, e.g., The Biden Plan for Full Participation and Equality for People with Disabilities, BIDEN HARRIS, 
https://joebiden.com/disabilities [https://perma.cc/KV42-7XAW] (discussing President Biden’s goals of 
“equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for individuals 
with disabilities); Michelle Diament, Biden Pandemic Strategy Puts Focus On People With Disabilities, DISABILITY 
SCOOP (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2021/01/25/biden-pandemic-strategy-puts-focus-on-
people-with-disabilities/29163 [https://perma.cc/Y4LA-UCA6] (outlining President Biden’s attempts to 
support the disabled community particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic); Exec. Order No. 13,995, 
86 Fed. Reg. 7193 (Jan. 26, 2021); Maggie Astor, Elizabeth Warren Opens a New Front in Disability Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-disability-plan.html 
[https://perma.cc/K4XJ-5LNC] (discussing then-presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s plans to assist 
individuals with disabilities, including free education and elimination of sub-minimum wage pay); LISA 
SCHUR & DOUGLAS KRUSE, FACT SHEET: DISABILITY AND VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2018 ELECTIONS 
1-2 (2019), https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/ 
Fact%20Sheet%20Disability%20Voter%202018%20Elections.pdf [https://perma.cc/A25K-SFBH] (reporting 
that “[v]oter turnout surged” in the November 2018 election cycle among people with disabilities and 
comparing 14.3 million people with disabilities voting with an estimated 15.2 million Black people and 11.7 
million Latinx people voting in the cycle). 
6 I made a narrower claim in an earlier piece. See generally Jasmine E. Harris, Processing 
Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2015) (arguing that a history of closed adjudicative proceedings 
created a public deficit of information about disabilities that would help challenge antiquated stigma 
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has generated Pyrrhic victories with underappreciated negative costs that stunt, 
rather than advance, the broader antidiscrimination mission of the law itself.7 
Research on disability stigma and prejudice suggests that disability stigma 
is quite sticky, and while the built world has indeed changed, attitudinal shifts 
remain stagnant. For example, a recent longitudinal study of implicit and 
explicit discriminatory attitudes about sexuality, race, gender, skin tone, age, 
disability, and body weight revealed that, while explicit attitudes about all 
categories moved from negative to neutral and implicit attitudes about 
sexuality, race, gender, and skin tone shifted from negative to neutral or 
positive, implicit attitudes about disability and age remained static over the 
ten-year period studied.8 Researchers attributed the rapid attitudinal changes 
in the context of sexuality and race to the publicity and public debate (called 
“societal priority”) around these two areas of discrimination: “In the United 
States today, race and sexuality attitudes appear to be societally prioritized 
(e.g., through the Black Lives Matter movement or legislation about same-
sex marriage) and therefore are more frequently discussed than other 
attitudes, such as age or disability.”9 
The Center for Disease Control estimates that there are sixty-one million 
people with disabilities in the United States (one in four adults), the majority 
of whom are not readily identifiable as disabled individuals.10 Privacy masks 
 
of incapacity associated with disability). Other disability and health law scholars have heavily 
invested in the opposite position—that we ought to invest more in a privacy approach to prevent 
disability discrimination. See generally, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent 
Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097 (2015). 
7 Harris, supra note 2, at 916-31 (discussing the “logic of disability rights law” and its 
antidiscrimination mission (stylization omitted)). Scholars recognize the limitations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the persistence of disability discrimination. See, e.g., 
Mark C. Weber, The Common Law of Disability Discrimination, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 429, 431 n.11; 
Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with Disabilities Act at 25 Years: Lessons to Learn from the Convention 
on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 819, 822 (2015); see also SAMUEL R. 
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 116-28 
(2009) (noting underenforcement of the ADA as to public accommodations and employment and 
the limits of the ADA in promoting meaningful integration); Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. 
Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 885-93 (2006) 
(discussing remedial weakness such as the ability of the ADA to respond to serial employer-
offenders); Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1854 (2005) (discussing some commentators’ belief that Title II of the ADA 
“guarantees a secret and independent vote to people with disabilities” and that election 
administrators “are in utter noncompliance” with such a standard). 
8 Tessa E. S. Charlesworth & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. 
Long-Term Change and Stability From 2007 to 2016, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 174, 174 (2019). 
9 Id. at 181; see also id. (“Societal priority corresponds to more frequent and repeated exposure 
to debate or counterarguments that may, in turn, induce greater attitude change.”). 
10 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DISABILITY IMPACTS ALL OF US (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/documents/disabilities_impacts_all_of_us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6DH4-845L]. The number of people with less visible disabilities is difficult to assess 
with certainty for a number of reasons including reliance on self-selection and identification (which is 
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the prevalence, differentiation, and pervasiveness of disability in society. This 
allows nondisabled11 people to continue to narrowly associate disability with 
socially constructed aesthetic markers, such as wheelchairs, missing limbs, 
prosthetics, non-normative speech and behavior.12 For these individuals—
collectively, those with less visible disabilities—law and society aggressively 
nudge them to closet, pass, or cover disability identity to meet able-bodied and 
neurotypical expectations at great costs to physical and mental health,13 
relationships,14 employment opportunities, and financial success.15 
Consequently, without a robust continuum of disability to draw on, the 
differences between people with and without disabilities are exaggerated and 
perceived to be immutable, tragic, and pitiful. This allows nondisabled people 
to claim visible and measurable distinctions that can delineate the deserving, 
 
the subject of this Article), definitions of what counts as physical or visible or less apparent, etc. See 
infra Part IV. For the purpose of this Article, I will refer to individuals who manifest the aesthetics of 
disability (sensory and behavioral markers) interchangeably with physical or visible disability and those 
who do not manifest the aesthetic markers as people with less apparent disabilities. 
11 I use “nondisabled” and “people with disabilities” to make the point and ultimately 
demonstrate the fallacy of such rigid distinctions. 
12 See Harris, supra note 2, at 931 (coining the phrase “aesthetics of disability” to describe the 
aesthetic markers of disability that trigger affective responses in nondisabled people). 
13 Caroline Reilly writes: 
Resisting care . . . allows us to invoke normalcy and to pretend: We fight through the 
pain, mostly to prove to ourselves that we’re just like everyone else. And while that 
can feel like a triumph, we’re really just hurting ourselves. Pain is traumatic, and it 
stays with us—burrowing into our brain, our nervous system, and our skin. It’s for all 
these reasons that disclosure can be such a catharsis . . . . 
Caroline Reilly, The Intimate Act of Performing Pain, BITCH MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/privacy-and-disclosure-with-chronic-illnesses 
[https://perma.cc/H9U3-7CK9]. 
14 Describing her experiences dating with an invisible disability, Amy Gaeta frames the 
problem as ableism—not disability: 
[W]hat failed me the most was assumptions about disabled people and dating. First . . . 
assumptions that disability causes a tragic life, that dating us is a burden because we are 
“needy.” Dating us makes non-disabled people saints taking on a charity case. Second 
. . . the false notion that disability and sexiness are at odds. We might be “cute” in a 
pitiful sort of way, but never desirable. Lastly . . . the stereotype that disabled people 
have limited futures, so dating us is signing up for limited options and compromise. 
Amy Gaeta, Navigating Dating, Disability, and Disclosure, ROOTED IN RTS. (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://rootedinrights.org/navigating-dating-disability-and-disclosure [https://perma.cc/7T9N-NCWN]. 
15 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 
102-04 (1963). See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing this 
phenomenon for LGBTQ+ individuals). 
2021] Taking Disability Public 1687 
legitimate minority of people with disabilities from those perceived to be 
malingering charlatans.16 
Why should disability law be premised on catering to social norms? The 
answer is twofold. First, Congress identified the greatest barrier to inclusion 
for people with disabilities as antiquated attitudes and biases that associate 
disability with individual deficit, incapacity, and dependency.17 Second, the 
remedial impact of antidiscrimination law in this area cannot be realized unless 
we address these deeply rooted biases that are taken for granted as “normal” 
or “justified.”18 Legal actors argue, frame, and interpret existing 
antidiscrimination laws according to their common knowledge and experience. 
However, as this Article contends, privacy has prevented the development of 
meaningful public discourse to develop an accurate common base of 
knowledge about disability needed to advance antidiscrimination efforts. 
So how do we do attend to the information deficits in society about 
disability that undermine antidiscrimination efforts? In my last Article, The 
Aesthetics of Disability, I said we need to move beyond known or visible markers 
of disability which effectively define the scope of legitimate claims to disability 
rights.19 Here, I take up the other end of the aesthetic spectrum, the 
overwhelming majority of people with disabilities in the United States who 
do not exhibit commonly accepted physical or behavioral markers associated 
with disability. I explore why publicity is central to the normative work that 
needs to be done, and how the design of disability laws can incentivize 
publicity while carefully balancing legitimate privacy interests. Dismissing 
publicity as contrary to individual self-determination, as lawmakers, courts, 
and society continue to do, ignores the structural constraints on choices 
available to people with less apparent disabilities as well as the negative 
individual and collective costs of “passing” or “covering.”20 
I join several current scholarly debates with transferrable insights for 
other areas of law and society. First, and principally, I challenge well-
established assumptions about privacy and disability that permeate disability 
 
16 See, e.g., N. Ann Davis, Invisible Disability, 116 ETHICS 153, 210 (2005) (“The presumption 
that there are deep and obvious differences between being ‘normal’ and being disabled is one that is 
deeply and dogmatically held: it is taken to be self-evident.”). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate 
individuals with disabilities, and . . . such forms of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem . . . .”). 
18 Challenging the perceived neutrality of the status quo is central to the work of critical race 
theorists as well. See, e.g., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii, xiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall 
Thomas eds., 1995) (“The construction of ‘racism’ from . . . the ‘perpetrator perspective’ restrictively 
conceived racism as an intentional, albeit irrational, deviation by a conscious wrongdoer from 
otherwise neutral, rational, and just ways of distributing jobs, power, prestige, and wealth.”). 
19 Harris, supra note 2, at 967. 
20 Cf. Yoshino, supra note 15, at 813 (“[P]assing, too, exacts its costs.”). 
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laws. Last year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), the central civil rights legislation for people with 
disabilities. Consistent with this milestone, I join disability law scholars in 
reflecting on the efficacy of the ADA and its remedies. While the ADA visibly 
transformed the architectural landscape for improved physical accessibility,21 
it has experienced significantly less success in shifting social norms of 
disability, such as the association of disability with deficit.22 I part ways with 
scholars in this area by questioning the overreliance on privacy norms to do 
the antidiscrimination work without greater nuance. Second, and relatedly, 
this Article situates disability within the broader privacy literature by 
recognizing the collective interests at stake in this debate. I draw upon the 
privacy literature to argue for a more robust (and nuanced) analysis of privacy 
interests in the disability context. Third, this Article begins to explore the 
remedial value of publicity in disability law. In doing so, I join a broader 
discussion taking place in the civil rights and social movements literature 
where publicity continues to offer new possibilities for grassroots organizing, 
stigma reduction, and legislative reforms. I consider the #MeToo movement 
and the Dreamers as examples. 
This Article unfolds in five parts. Part I argues that the law treats 
disability as private. Privacy was originally forced upon people with 
disabilities in an effort to segregate and render them invisible through legal 
regulation much like the experience of other marginalized communities in the 
United States.23 Along the way, however, social progressives and some legal 
scholars have come to embrace the antidiscrimination properties of privacy 
as a more powerful prescription to address contemporary forms of 
discrimination—such as implicit biases, data mining, and surveillance—that 
are difficult to address through our existing antidiscrimination frameworks. 
Part II then explains the logic of privacy norms in the disability context 
and places this discussion within broader debates among privacy and 
antidiscrimination scholars. 
Part III argues that disability law has an overall preference for privacy and 
explains why this preference makes sense. Sometimes, disability law requires 
disclosure of disability, such as when a disabled individual wants to secure a 
 
21 See Harris, supra note 2 at 896 (noting the ADA’s focus on “access to employment, public 
services, and places of public accommodations”). 
22 See, e.g., Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 8, at 174 (describing longitudinal, comparative 
analysis of patterns of long-term change in social-group attitudes (sexual orientation, race, skin tone, 
age, disability, and body weight) and finding that all explicit responses changed toward attitude 
neutrality but while implicit responses also changed toward neutrality for sexual orientation, race, 
and skin-tone attitudes, there was stability over time for age and disability attitudes). 
23 See infra Part V. (discussing the value of publicity). 
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reasonable accommodation.24 Most other times, however, disability and 
related areas of law nudge privacy by establishing rights to confidential 
treatment of information about disability or regulating the effects of 
disclosure of that information. This proclivity for privacy stems from its 
relative effectiveness in preventing discrimination. Said differently, disability 
and related laws nudge individuals and institutions to protect information 
about disability identity either by creating incentives for individual 
nondisclosure or, when law requires its disclosure, ensuring that the disclosed 
information remains under lock and key. In this way, law incentivizes 
institutional actors to protect this information or face potential legal liability. 
Part IV argues that the law’s preference for privacy is not costless. First, 
privacy nudges obscure the pervasiveness and diversity of disability in society, 
reducing public perceptions of disability to a narrow set of aesthetic markers. 
Second, privacy nudges create “ambiguity aversion”25 that can force 
discrimination underground and make people with less visible disabilities 
more susceptible to implicit biases. Third, and relatedly, these nudges 
privatize the costs of accommodations and mask the need (and opportunity) 
for broader structural reforms. 
Finally, Part V contends that publicity26 has underexplored benefits and 
argues that we should recalibrate disability law and policy to reflect these 
values. Part V concludes with a discussion of three concrete ways to 
incorporate publicity values in disability law and policy: data, institutional 
incentives, and law reforms. 
Taking disability public requires a nuanced approach that surfaces the 
values and risks associated with legal designs that privilege privacy. 
Importantly, this approach does not signal the demise of existing privacy 
rights and individual agency. Legal scholars justify the current privacy nudges 
underwriting disability law in service of decisional autonomy, particularly for 
people with less apparent disabilities. Closer examination of the quality of 
available choices shows that meaningful protection from discrimination is 
often predicated on concealment of disability identity. A person without the 
aesthetics of disability can choose, for example, to self-accommodate 
 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“[T]he term ‘discriminate against a qualified individual on 
the basis of disability’ includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
25 See infra Section IV.B. 
26 ”Publicity” means institutional and individual public association with disability which 
includes, but is not limited to, personal disclosure. This concept is more than “visibility” as it 
requires an affirmative engagement with others and the process of adopting and disclosing. This 
Article argues that publicity should become a guiding normative principle shaping disability 
antidiscrimination laws. See infra Part V. 
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(assuming certain risks27) and avoid the costs of disclosure including stigma 
and discrimination.28 Alternatively, that person can disclose disability 
identity in the workplace, for example, to obtain a reasonable 
accommodation. The disabled individual, then, must rely on existing 
antidiscrimination frameworks to prevent and, where possible, remedy legally 
recognized harms if they arise.29 Said differently, risk aversion warrants 
hiding to avoid disability stigma and discrimination (but it is the individual’s 
choice). If, the person needs an accommodation or wants to disclose disability 
to someone, again, it is the individual’s choice, but if there is a problem, the 
individual must rely on a legal structure designed to remedy forms of explicit 
discrimination that is ill-equipped to address contemporary manifestations of 
implicit biases. This Article challenges this narrow vision of agency. I argue 
that by reframing the stakes, we can have a more robust (and accurate) debate 
regarding the value of publicity not only to the individual but also to people 
with disabilities and society more broadly. 
I. DISABILITY AS PRIVATE 
Part I traces the construction of disability as a private fact. There are good 
reasons for advancing privacy norms in the context of disability. Disclosure 
of a concealable stigmatized social identity is risky. People who disclose can 
be exposed to discrimination, bias, negative stereotypes or, in some cases, 
violence.30 The treatment of disability identity as private reflects a 
complicated history of deliberate state action to segregate, hide, rehabilitate, 
or eliminate disability.31 
 
27 Such risks include actual costs of self-accommodation. A person with a learning disability 
who may need extra time to process the written information may, for example, work longer hours 
but not report them to the employer. Over time, this may not only increase the emotional and 
physical stress on the individual but may place the person at a disadvantage financially since they 
have worked significant overtime without securing the financial benefit. This individual may be 
reluctant to seek out additional social or work-related opportunities because they simply do not have 
the time to do so. 
28 The extreme approach advanced by some disability law scholars is to avoid disclosure 
altogether as the only effective way to control the disclosure and secondary disclosure of information 
about disability. See, e.g., infra Part II. 
29 There may be additional permutations here. I am not suggesting a clean binary, rather one 
framing that descriptively accounts for the qualitatively poor choices under the current structure. 
30 See, e.g., Debra McKinney, The Invisible Hate Crime, INTEL. REP., Summer 2018, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/invisible-hate-crime 
[https://perma.cc/KT2K-MLQT] (discussing the history, incidence, and nature of hate crimes against 
disabled persons). 
31 There are places where disability rights law requires disclosure, namely, for purposes of 
requesting a reasonable accommodation and exercising rights under the ADA. The point is that 
there are many areas where privacy is the default and people are encouraged, if they can, to pass as 
nondisabled. See infra Part III. 
2021] Taking Disability Public 1691 
A. Defining Privacy 
Privacy is elusive.32 Part of the difficulty in defining privacy comes from 
its strategic deployment in public discourse as everything from an individual 
right to a dignity interest or to a well-established norm related to personal 
agency.33 Privacy includes the substance of the data which, in turn, may signal 
different public and private interests in that information and, ultimately, who 
controls the data and regulates it (individual, public, or private actors).34 In 
any formulation, privacy means more than personal data and more than 
individual interests in dignity and autonomy; privacy is about power, a set of 
rules used to regulate information that can control our lives.35 Descriptive 
accounts of privacy—delineating what is, in fact, protected as private—differ 
in the legal scholarship from normative accounts of privacy: defending its 
value and the extent to which it should be protected. In these discussions, 
some treat privacy as an interest with moral value, while others refer to 
privacy as a legal right that ought to be protected by society or the law.36 Still 
 
32 Arthur Miller described privacy as “difficult to define” precisely because “it is exasperatingly 
vague and evanescent.” ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA 
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971); see also NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 1, 3) (on file with author) (“[N]o one—not the general public, not 
policymakers, nor even scholars—can quite agree on what precisely we mean by ‘privacy.’”). 
33 See, e.g., Sjaak van der Geest, Lying in Defence of Privacy: Anthropological and Methodological 
Observations, 21 INT’L J. SOC. RSCH. METHODOLOGY 541, 541 (2018) (“[T]he concept of privacy 
defies a precise definition because it refers to experiences that are too close to look at objectively.”). 
This Article draws upon existing research and legal scholarship to define “privacy.” While I offer a 
normative view of privacy in the disability context, I do not weigh in on the more abstract discussion 
of the bounds and nature of privacy in U.S. law. 
34 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 
1182-83 (2017) (reviewing FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NIESSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S 
GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015)) (arguing that conversations about the “digital divide” fail 
to capture that it is not just about access to the technology, but the power dynamics among those who 
create, monitor, and regulate the digital technology and the personal data that fuels them). References 
to privacy in the disability context can also mean that families rather than the state have to deal with 
it. Or, as I note in the text, it can also mean that a person’s disability status is private in that they do 
not have to disclose it to others. Finally, privacy could mean that certain people should not enter the 
public sphere, a frame originally used against women, Black, LGBTQ+, and Latinx communities. 
35 RICHARDS, supra note 32 (manuscript intro. at 4); see, e.g., Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities art. 22, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining privacy as freedom from 
state interference in private affairs and setting out the obligation of states to “protect the privacy of 
personal, health and rehabilitation information . . . on an equal basis with others”); id. art. 31(1)(a) 
(“The process of collecting and maintaining . . . information shall . . . [c]omply with legally 
established safeguards, including legislation on data protection, to ensure confidentiality and respect 
for the privacy of persons with disabilities . . . .”). 
36 See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 23 (2011) 
(“[T]he actual, reliable experience of privacy is a moral imperative and can be a requirement of social 
justice.”). Critics of privacy, such as Richard Posner, claim that privacy interests are not distinctive 
because the personal interests they protect are economically inefficient. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, 
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 233-37 (1981); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
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others, reframe the analysis away from protections the individual wants or 
those forms of privacy accepted by most as appropriate for protection 
(“popular privacy”) and those forms of privacy that are unwanted or 
unprotected (“unpopular privacy”) but which, nevertheless, may warrant the 
state denying the individual control over the disclosure decision because it 
concerns matters fundamental to our sense of self, agency, or dignity.37 
Privacy scholars generally believe in privacy’s instrumental (rather than 
intrinsic) value; that is, privacy ought to serve broader values and interests of 
society such as identity formation or democratic participation.38 Similarly, 
our varied conceptions of privacy, however distinct, have certain consistent 
elements, namely, that individual dignity and autonomy interests drive 
discussions; responsibility is largely placed on the individual to police misuse; 
and the nature of the data, if involuntarily disclosed, is perceived to cause 
reputational harm and related costs.39 First, conceptions of privacy elevate 
individual interests: “In the United States, information privacy has 
 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 99-100 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s construction of “privacy” lacks a well-defined jurisprudential basis); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 187-88 (1989) (advancing a feminist 
critique of privacy, namely, that special treatment of privacy can be harmful when used as a shield 
for violence against women). 
37 ALLEN, supra note 36, at 6, 10-13. Anita Allen’s robust, influential body of work has 
demonstrated the existence of beneficial forms of privacy and the importance of private choice for 
some historically marginalized communities such as women, people of color, and LGBTQ 
communities. See, e.g., id.; Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1721-22 (2010) [hereinafter Allen, Privacy Torts] (examining the efficacy of the 
privacy tort in the context of LGBT rights); Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 
STAN L. REV. 1175 (2000); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874-
75 (2019) (arguing that “sexual privacy sits at the apex of privacy values because of its importance to 
sexual agency, intimacy, and equality,” particularly for women). 
38 RICHARDS, supra note 32 (manuscript intro. at 8) (exploring the value of privacy to 
advancing “identity, freedom, and protection”). Richards’s conception of “intellectual privacy” 
focuses on identity formation across multiple domains such as religious and political. See id. 
(manuscript intro. at 8-9) (noting that the notion of privacy as freedom to explore and define oneself 
is quite different from the views of privacy skeptics such as Richard Posner who believe that privacy 
allows people to be dishonest about their true selves). 
39 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (1967). Professor Westin described 
four types of aspects of privacy with four related functions. The types or aspects of privacy include: 
solitude (being alone), intimacy (being alone with only one or a few close others), anonymity (being 
with others but unknown to them and unobserved, ‘lost in a crowd’), and reserve (being with others 
but having erected a ‘psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion’). Id. In terms of the goals or 
effects of privacy, Westin described personal autonomy (which includes self-identity and the ability 
to control communication and interaction with others); emotional release (the option of 
withdrawing and being free from observation by others); self-evaluation (the possibility of reflecting 
on one’s position vis-à-vis others); and protected communication (sharing confidential things with 
selected others). See also Koops et al., supra note 1, at 566 (building on Westin’s typology by 
describing eight basic types of privacy occurring in four zones (personal, intimate, semi-private, and 
public) with a ninth type, (informational privacy), which is described as “an overlay related to each 
underlying type”). 
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historically been defined as an individual concern rather than a general 
societal value or a public interest problem.”40 Classically, this is Louis 
Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s notion of privacy as “the right to be let 
alone.”41 Second, and relatedly, legal and policy remedies emphasize harm to 
the individual.42 Legal doctrines such as informed consent become the 
primary means of describing and regulating offenses to individual autonomy. 
The responsibility for identification and redress of violations of informed 
consent rests with the individual. Third, the “private” label describes its 
substance or content and a belief that inadvertent disclosure could result in 
embarrassment, unnecessary social tension, or negative consequences to the 
individual or family members (such as one’s status as a sex offender, recipient 
of public welfare benefits, or survivor of sexual assault). 
B. How Disability Became a Private Fact 
Contemporary privacy norms are byproducts of at least four key historical 
ingredients: (1) a conceptual and regulatory divide between “public” and 
“private” spheres; (2) the rise of the public welfare system; (3) the 
development of health sciences, rehabilitation, and the medical profession; 
and (4) in employment, “scientific management” and, separately, the 
professionalization of human resources. 
1. Separation of “Public” and “Private” Spheres 
First, association of disability with the “private sphere” of family and care 
outside of the public (and state’s) interests has shaped its treatment as private 
information.43 This fictious binary treats legal and policy matters related to 
the home, relationships, the body, or caregiving (highly gendered) to be 
 
40 James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). 
41 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[The 
Founders] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive 
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). Interestingly, Justice Brandeis also valued 
transparency and “sunlight” for the public good. See Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, 
HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10 (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”). 
42 See, e.g., Nehf, supra note 40, at 4 (describing survey results showing that while the public 
holds data and information privacy as a priority, “a great number of [people also] understand that 
[their] interests in privacy must be balanced against other interests, i.e., the multitude of benefits 
resulting from more efficient government, business, and law enforcement functions when 
information in digital form is readily accessible.”); see also Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy On the 
Internet: Whose Information is it Anyway?, 38 JURIMETRICS 565, 566 (1998) (recognizing the 
difficulties of defining privacy and its continued elusive nature because it is highly dependent on 
technological capabilities and developments, and social norms and values). 
43 See SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 40 (1996). 
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outside of a “public sphere,” the home of legitimate state interests, such as 
economic markets and state regulation.44 Privacy was billed as protective, 
intended to shield the agency of individuals and households from state 
overreaching.45 However, emphasis on legitimate zones of state regulation, at 
least initially, gave states license to avoid duties to protect historically 
vulnerable and marginalized groups (on the basis of race,46 gender,47 or sexual 
identity48). For example, feminist legal theorists have well documented the 
ways in which attaching a privacy label has “operated to make violence against 
women legally and politically invisible.”49 The care and support for people 
with disabilities through the mid-nineteenth century was left to families, 
churches, and charities, in part, a function of its ontological ties to moral 
depravity, punishment, and deviance.50 The state intervened to police 
disability in public spaces through municipal ordinances and criminal laws 
and, in its parens patriae function, to assure control over property.51 The 
infamous “ugly laws,”52 for example, criminalized “unsightly beggar[s]” and 
 
44 As Bart van der Sloot writes: 
Privacy is perhaps the oldest legal principle. It pertains to the separation of the public 
and private domain. Where that boundary lies exactly differs from culture to culture, 
epoch to epoch, and country to country, but there always is one. In ancient times, the 
ruler or king had authority over the public domain, while the household fell under the 
rule of the pater familias, the male breadwinner of the family, who reigned over his 
family members like a king. The separation of the public domain from the private 
domain, meant that public laws, in principle, held no sway over the household. 
Bart van der Sloot, Privacy from a Legal Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRIVACY STUDIES: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 68-70 (Bart van der Sloot & Aviva de Groot eds., 2018) 
(footnote omitted). 
45 Id. at 70. 
46 E.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 2016 
BYU L. REV. 575, 582, 615-16 (discussing the state action doctrine’s distinction between public and 
private spheres and how the civil rights movement brought formerly “private” racial discrimination, for 
example, in places of public accommodations, within the purview of state regulation). 
47 See Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 
CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322-23 (1993) (offering an overview of early feminist critiques of the 
“public/private distinction”). 
48 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (“[T]he proposition that any kind of private 
sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is 
unsupportable.”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
49 Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2000). 
50 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 94 (2000) (“In 
colonial America, people with disabilities were viewed primarily in terms of their dependency. Wherever 
possible, people with disabilities were cared for by their relatives, who often hid them out of shame.”). 
51 See Harris, supra note 6, at 509-10 (discussing the evolution of guardianship proceedings as 
a means for managing the property of people believed to be legally incompetent). 
52 Marcia Pearce Burgdorf and Robert Burgdorf Jr. coined this term in 1975, but Susan Schweik 
used it as the title of her book and expanded upon it greatly through her thorough discussion of the 
legal history in this area. See generally SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN 
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forced people with disabilities from public spaces by imposing hefty fines on 
poor people who, when they expectedly could not pay, were confined to 
poorhouses and jails.53 These laws remained on the books well into the 
twentieth century and were enforced (albeit infrequently) as late as 1974.54 
Institutions, therefore, regulated the appearance of disability (and its related 
marginalized identities).55 Disability was as a social eyesore, a personal 
tragedy, and thus, a private fact to be hidden from those outside of the home. 
People with disabilities became invisible, and as a result, “pitied, excluded, 
and/or cared for outside of the mainstream of society.”56 
Furthermore, the public-private divide forms the basis for the Supreme 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence from Griswold v. Connecticut onward.57 For 
example, in Whalen v. Roe, even as the Court upheld a New York law requiring 
people taking certain controlled prescription drugs to file their names with 
the state Health Department, it nevertheless recognized that these 
individuals had a legitimate privacy interest in their medical data.58 
Constitutional legal scholarship in the area of informational privacy is well-
developed and beyond the scope of this project.59 One upshot of the literature 
is that the Supreme Court understands information privacy as highly 
individualized and rooted in three interests: to avoid disclosure of personal 
matters; to maintain autonomy in personal decision-making; and to assimilate 
whenever possible.60 Subsequent case law has shaped the scope of 
 
PUBLIC (2009); Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The 
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA 
CLARA LAW. 855, 863 (1975) (coining the term “ugly laws”). 
53 SCHWEIK, supra note 52, at 26-27 (noting that these nuisance ordinances imposed hefty fines 
on offenders—for example, the equivalent of over $350—but offered an alternative for those unable 
to pay: confinement in the Almshouses). 
54 Id. at 6. 
55 Disability, like poverty, was often used as a proxy to regulate other disfavored identities. 
Accordingly, no single explanation can account for the emergence of the policing of the unsightly 
beggar in American culture. See id. at 24 (identifying “the persistent nexus of disability and poverty 
at the heart of the ugly law, as well as . . . the complex interweaving of economic unrest, social policy 
and cultural (including aesthetic) imagination at work”). As Professor Schweik notes, disability is 
inherently intersectional, as the ugly laws were “a matrix of codes concerning local purity: decency 
and exhibition, gender and sexuality.” Id. at 144; see also Harris, supra note 2, at 897 (identifying 
sensory and behavioral markers associated with disability). 
56 Feldblum, supra note 50, at 95. 
57 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (extending the right of 
privacy to abortion). In part, the connection between privacy and health allowed disability status to 
move seamlessly into this framework. See generally Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional 
Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991) (discussing the early development of 
the Court’s informational privacy jurisprudence); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 737 (1989) (same). 
58 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). 
59 See generally, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2015). 
60 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600. As Robin Pierce summarizes it: 
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constitutional protection, including the importation of doctrinal principles 
such as “reasonable expectation of privacy” from the Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.61 Courts apply an intermediate standard of review in such an 
analysis and balance the privacy interests against the interests in disclosure 
of personal information.62 
2. Disability as Dependency 
Second, the rise of the public welfare system, and state interest in its 
regulation, shaped the treatment of disability as private information. The 
“shameful” association of disability with state dependency caused many 
people to reject disability as antithetical to American identity. Legal 
historians mark the Civil War as a critical moment in the construction of 
disability as part of national rhetoric of disfavored identity.63 The choice to 
“cast disabled veterans as primarily disabled and dependent rather than as 
 
Such decisions exist within the “private sphere”. This seemingly simple concept 
frequently escalates in complexity when confronted with situations in which the 
decision would appear to lie with the patient, but the interests of others are implicated 
by the individual’s decision. This occurs, for example, in the case of infectious disease 
and, in some jurisdictions, decisions regarding abortion. The operation of decisional 
privacy can also be seen in the use of consent-substitutes such as advance directives 
for care or research, a mechanism that is intended to perpetuate autonomy even after 
the person loses the capacity to consent. 
Robin Pierce, Medical Privacy: Where Deontology and Consequentialism Meet, in HANDBOOK OF 
PRIVACY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 327, 329 (internal citations omitted). 
61 See Nixon v. Admin’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (“[W]hen Government 
intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not wholly without 
constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by 
them in their public capacity.”); see also Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related 
Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 
82 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 148-49 (1994) (discussing the importation by the Court of “‘the legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ standard from Fourth Amendment search and seizure decisions into a case 
dealing with the violation of privacy interests through disclosure of personal information” (citing 
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457-65)). 
62 Doughty, supra note 61, at 149-50. Until recently, the abortion and gay rights jurisprudence 
relied on the right of the plaintiff to reveal no facts about themselves. Plaintiffs did not reveal facts 
in either Roe or Bowers. In recent years, that strategy has ended. There are now briefs including 
narratives about the lives of women who have had abortions or members of the LGBTQ+ 
community seeking to marry. 
63 See, e.g., Rabia Belt, Ballots for Bullets?: Disabled Veterans and the Right to Vote, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
435, 439 (2017) (“War was not just an engine of democracy. It was a factory of death and disability. As 
it disabled, it transformed. Citizen-soldiers became dependent citizens. And this dependency carried 
oft-detrimental political, social, and legal consequences.”); Peter Blanck, “The Right to Live in the 
World”: Disability Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 367, 370 (2008) (“The 
Civil War changed how Americans thought about disability. Attitudes were shaped about and by 
returning disabled veterans and their families as they engaged the Civil War pension system.”). 
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primarily veterans” worthy of public support had long-lasting effects.64 The 
veterans’ pension scheme was, at the time, the “nation’s largest and most 
medicalized welfare scheme.”65 Payments initially required a causal 
connection to war-related impairments as determined by means of a detailed 
medical rating system for compensating “legitimate” disabilities.66 Veterans 
received payments regardless of socioeconomic status. Later, however, the 
federal government and states tied eligibility to pension benefits to the 
existence of a medically recognized disability and socioeconomic status as 
indigent.67 Medical professionals and legal institutions—courts, public 
agencies—became the gatekeepers of one’s public identity as “disabled” and, 
by extension, access to limited pools of public benefits including social 
security, cash assistance, food stamps, and subsidized housing and health care. 
Physicians rated claimants’ disabilities in relation to their ability to 
participate in the labor market, sorting them by disease and severity.68 
“Pensioners with visible or ‘less obscure’ injuries from gunshot wounds” were 
subject to less attitudinal prejudice and were less likely to be rejected by the 
Pension Bureau, while veterans with less visible, less common, and, thus, less 
understood conditions faced attitudinal prejudice and skepticism, resulting in 
higher rates of outright denial.69 
Similarly, in the context of immigration law, disability was (and continues 
to be) grounds for exclusion from the United States because of the 
unquestioned assumption that disability means dependency.70 Ellis Island 
 
64 Belt, supra note 63, at 443. 
65 Blanck, supra note 63, at 370-71. 
66 Id. at 371, 375-76. Later payments expanded to include disorders and diseases arising out of 
war that caused disability later on. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, 17 Stat. 566; Act of June 27, 
1890, ch. 634, 26 Stat. 182. 
67 William P. Quigley, The Quicksands of the Poor Law: Poor Relief Legislation in a Growing Nation, 
1790-1820, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (1997) (discussing a change to the revolutionary war pension 
scheme); Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 
1105-1108 (2010) (discussing contemporary varied veterans’ benefits programs including the means-
tested Veterans Administration Pension Program). 
68 Blanck, supra note 63, at 370-72. 
69 Id. at 377. 
70 Immigration laws once included explicit exclusions for persons with disabilities. See, e.g., Act 
of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (excluding “lunatic[s], idiot[s], or any person unable to 
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” from entry to the United States); 
see also Douglas C. Baynton, Defectives in the Land: Disability and American Immigration Policy, 1882-
1924, 24 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 31, 33-34 (2005) (explaining how immigration laws denied admission 
to “mental or physically defective [persons]” and to anyone with “any mental abnormality whatever” 
(first quoting Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899; then quoting U.S. PUB. HEALTH 
SERV., REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE MEDICAL INSPECTION OF ALIENS 30 (1917))). While 
much of this exclusion has since been repealed, immigration law today explicitly maintains the 
“public charge” language, while also excluding persons with “physical and mental disorder[s]” who 
have “harmful behavior[s]” that pose a threat to oneself or others. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) 
(“public charge”); id. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (“physical or mental disorder”). 
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played a critical role in the construction of disability and its connotations. 
State-imposed labels of illness, insanity, and criminality tracked racist and 
xenophobic views of undesirability: 
The social processing that Ellis Island engendered was all about identifying 
and sometimes manufacturing abnormal bodies: these elements are out of 
place; these bodies are disordered. . . . At Ellis Island, the categories of defect 
and disability that adhere today were strongly grounded if not created, as was 
the diagnostic gaze that allowed for the nebulous application of the stigma of 
disability as we know it . . . .71 
For example, when immigrants passed through Ellis Island, they “became 
part of an indelible marking, [the immigrant] body was interrogated, written 
across, and read into.”72 Interestingly, the very design of Ellis Island as a series 
of stairs and pathways was a perfect mix of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and 
Henry Ford’s assembly line that offered agents at Ellis Island the opportunity 
to inspect immigrant bodies, behaviors, and minds with every step from 
multiple angles. In this way, the construction of a maze of stairs tested 
physical mobility, the requirement that they carry their luggage demonstrated 
strength and endurance, and the winding maze operated like one big catwalk 
for aesthetic inspection. Ellis Island also provided a testing ground for 
empirical and rhetorical social sorting tools (e.g., IQ tests); it was “a genetic 
experiment” facilitated by the expansion of medical science, as the next 
subsection explains.73 
3. Medical and Health Law Frames 
Third, and relatedly, the increasing medicalization of disability in the late 
nineteenth century reduced disability identity to a sum of medical diagnoses 
defined and controlled by medical professionals. This “medical model” of 
disability locates the deficiency in the person rather than in relation to how 
social institutions respond to individual impairment.74 In other words, a 
 
71 Jay Dolmage, Disabled upon Arrival: The Rhetorical Construction of Disability and Race at Ellis 
Island, 77 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 24, 26 (2011). 
72 Id. at 24. 
73 Id. at 27-28. 
74 See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the 
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 185-86 (2008) (footnote 
omitted) (“The medical model views the physiological condition itself as the problem. In other 
words, ‘the individual is the locus of [ . . .] disability.’” (quoting Mary Crossley, The Disability 
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649 (1999))); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 426-31 (2000) (describing the medical model of 
disability as one that “treat[s] disability as an inherent personal characteristic that should ideally be 
fixed, rather than as a characteristic that draws its meaning from social context”); Elizabeth F. 
Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1401 (“The medical model is the idea, common 
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wheelchair user is disabled by the design choice of stairs rather than by a 
mobility impairment itself. The medical model describes disability as an 
abnormal, personal defect or impairment in need of medical correction, cure, 
or mitigation relative to an able-bodied, nondisabled “fit” or “healthy,” 
athletic male.75 Medical professionals and researchers sought ways to identify, 
label, and diagnose disabilities. At times, the explicit goal was the eradication 
of disability76 and, at other times, the goal was treatment, cure, or 
rehabilitation.77 For example, the modern practice of fingerprinting and its 
related data collection comes from a eugenic policy initiative to track and 
mark disability.78 In this way, medical diagnoses and medical data become 
synonymous (and conflated) with disability identity, placing its construction, 
evaluation, and legitimacy in the hands of medical professionals. While there 
is certainly a connection between someone who has a medical condition, for 
example, AIDS or status as HIV positive, this does not necessarily track 
whether the person identifies with disability as a sociopolitical identity.79 
The benefits of nondisclosure of disability (with invisible or less apparent 
disabilities), shaped directly by legislation, have outweighed the benefits of 
publicly claiming disability for many people. Consider the incentives for 
nondisclosure. Laws codified the gatekeeping role of the medical profession 
 
to mainstream portrayals, that disability is an individual medical problem.”). Consider how the 
Hippocratic Oath itself developed and maintained to ensure candor and allow doctors to get the 
best most accurate information from patients to help with medical treatment. If doctors (like 
lawyers) did not offer this protection, the accepted wisdom goes, then people would be more reticent 
to offer embarrassing or damaging information and/or seek care. 
75 See ROSEMARIE GARLAND THOMSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES: FIGURING PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE 12 (1997) (coining the notion of the 
“normate” or culturally constructed corporeal normativity); Lennard J. Davis, Introduction: 
Normality, Power, and Culture, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 1, 6 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th 
ed. 2013) (discussing the fitness of the body and its connection to eugenics and national identity). 
76 See Davis, supra note 75, at 4 (“[O]ne of the inducements to making these inquiries into 
personal identification has been to discover independent features suitable for hereditary investigation 
. . . . [I]t is not improbable, and worth taking pains to inquire whether each person may not carry 
visibly about his body undeniable evidence of his parentage and near kinships.” (citing DONALD A. 
MACKENZIE, STATISTICS IN BRITAIN, 1865-1930, at 65 (1981) (quoting Sir Francis Galton)))). 
77 This was the driving ideology for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—as the name suggests, it is 
spending clause legislation designed to provide a remedy for discrimination in federally funded 
employment, programs, and services to move people with disabilities into the formal economy and 
reduce reliance on public welfare. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-18). 
78 Data collection dates back to the early efforts of Sir Francis Galton, a key figure in the 
international eugenics movements, to develop our modern system of fingerprinting, “a kind of serial 
number written on the body.” Davis, supra note 75, at 4. Fingerprinting then develops as a way to 
identify, track, and “out” criminals who wished to hide their flawed and deviant identities. Id. 
79 This is true even if the person meets the federal definition of disability under disability rights 
laws such as the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The term “disability” means, with respect to an 
individual, one who meets the federal threshold definition of disability—that is, “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
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by requiring explicit diagnoses for eligibility for public benefits and “proof” 
from medical experts of deservedness. States embraced medical diagnoses as 
neutral, empirical proof of deservedness of a limited social safety net and the 
benefits of citizenship. Claiming disability could mean experiencing stigma, 
and more concretely, systemic exclusion from voting,80 marriage,81 
parenting,82 and even procreation.83 In fact, involuntary sterilization laws 
advanced societal norms of disability as deficit and dependency with our 
nation’s highest Court’s blessing in Buck v. Bell.84 Such views of disabled lives 
as sad, depressing, and lacking in value persist today.85 A recent study of 
 
80 In thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia, persons deemed “incapacitated” or 
“incompetent” as a result of mental disorder may be stripped of their voting rights. Matt 
Vasilogambros, Thousands Lose Right to Vote Under ‘Incompetence’ Laws, PEW (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/21/thousands-lose-
right-to-vote-under-incompetence-laws [https://perma.cc/EZ2A-R4V4]; see, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 177(b) (“No person . . . who is mentally incompetent . . . shall be qualified to vote until . . . 
removal of disability.”). 
81 See, e.g., Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and Support 
Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 567 (2006) (explaining that under 20 C.F.R. § 416.412, 
individuals with disabilities who marry lose money under social security programs). 
82 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(2) (2019) (providing that “[e]motional illness, mental 
illness, or mental deficiency of the parent, or excessive use of alcohol or controlled substances, of a 
duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for needs of the child” is a ground for 
terminating parental rights); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: 
ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 16 (2012), 
https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WL8-
VLC8] (“Fully two-thirds of dependency statutes allow the court to reach the determination that a parent 
is unfit (a determination necessary to terminate parental rights) on the basis of the parent’s disability. 
In every state, disability may be considered in determining the best interest of a child for purposes 
of a custody determination in family or dependency court.”); id. (“Removal rates where parents have 
a psychiatric disability have been found to be as high as 70 percent to 80 percent; where the parent 
has an intellectual disability, 40 percent to 80 percent. In families where the parental disability is 
physical, 13 percent have reported discriminatory treatment in custody cases.”). See generally 
CHILD.’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (2017), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9U7C-PBST] (discussing state statutes providing for the termination of parental rights by 
a court). 
83 See generally David Pfeiffer, Eugenics and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY & SOC. 481 
(1994) (documenting the history of involuntary sterilization laws targeting individuals with disabilities). 
84 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For discussions of the implications of Buck v. Bell, see generally 
Jasmine E. Harris, Commentary to Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE REWRITTEN 15 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson ed., 2020), and Jasmine E. 
Harris, Why Buck v. Bell Still Matters, BILL OF HEALTH, HARV. L. SCH. PETRIE-FLOM CTR. 
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/14/why-buck-v-bell-still-matters 
[https://perma.cc/DZK7-EEA8]. 
85 See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, A Dozen Calls to Child Abuse Hotline Did Not Save 8-Year-Old Boy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/nyregion/nypd-cop-autistic-
son.html [https://perma.cc/7YMT-F7TC] (describing the horrific abuse of an autistic child by his 
father); Corina Knoll, Sweethearts Forever. Then Came Alzheimer’s, Murder and Suicide, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/nyregion/alzheimers-murder-suicide.html 
[https://perma.cc/PGB8-FLKG] (framing husband’s murder of wife with Alzheimer’s as “a new love 
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physicians’ perceptions of the quality of disabled lives, for example, found 
that 82.4% reported that people with a significant disability have a worse 
quality of life than nondisabled people and only 40.7% of physicians surveyed 
were “very confident” about their ability to provide the same quality of care 
to disabled and nondisabled patients.86 
4. “Scientific Management” and the Professionalization of HR 
Two additional factors in the context of employment have also contributed 
to the treatment of disability as private and have increased the costs of claiming 
disability.87 First, “scientific management,” or the trend toward greater 
optimization, has created an environment where employers engineer one “best” 
method of job performance. In doing so, employers create the “ideal worker” 
who can perform those specific tasks in the method prescribed without 
deviation.88 The very notion of disability accommodations requires flexibility 
with the methods of performing what are deemed the essential functions of the 
job title. Not only does scientific management remove discretion from the 
employees as to the process of accomplishing a stated work goal, it also removes 
discretion from supervisors in direct contact with employees to make small 
adjustments that might allow an employee with a disability to reach the 
ultimate goal of the position by following a different process. 
Related to scientific management is the professionalization of human 
resources compliance duties, which has also left line supervisors with less 
discretion to accommodate disability. Like the scientific management trend, 
professionalization of human resources reduces manager autonomy and 
ownership over compliance responsibilities, albeit in different ways. Unlike 
scientific management which removes discretion in the name of overall 
 
story”). Recent examples abound in state responses to the coronavirus pandemic. See generally 
Jasmine E. Harris, Essay, The Frailty of Disability Rights, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2020); 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Gets the Ventilator? Disability Discrimination in COVID-19 Medical-
Rationing Protocols, 130 YALE L.J.F. 1 (2020). 
86 Lisa I. Iezzoni, Sowmya R. Rao, Julie Ressalam, Dragana Bolcic-Jankovic, Nicole D. 
Agaronnik, Karen Donelan, Tara Lagu & Eric G. Campbell, Physicians’ Perceptions of People with 
Disability and Their Health Care, 40 HEALTH AFFS. 297, 300 (2021). These statistics offer empirical 
support for claims of differential care by some people with disabilities during the pandemic. See, e.g., 
Joseph Shapiro, One Man’s COVID-19 Death Raises the Worst Fears of Many People with Disabilities, NPR 
(Jul. 31, 2020, 3:29 PM) https://www.npr.org/2020/07/31/896882268/one-mans-covid-19-death-raises-
the-worst-fears-of-many-people-with-disabilities [https://perma.cc/6M56-P7TR] (discussing the 
death of forty-six-year-old Michael Hickson, a Black man with quadriplegia in a Texas hospital). 
87 I thank Professor Danielle D’Onfro for her thoughts here. 
88 See Peter Cappelli, Stop Overengineering People Management: The Trend Towards Optimization 
is Disempowering Employees, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2020, at 56, 59 (“Labor is treated as a 
commodity, and the goal is to cut it to a minimum by replacing employees with contract and gig 
workers . . . . Ideal behaviors are dictated to the remaining employees, who are closely monitored 
for compliance.”). 
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optimization, the professionalization of human resources has created a 
climate where managers are told to refer anything plausibly related to 
compliance issues to human resources.89 Thus, whereas a request to a manager 
for time to go to a doctor’s appointment might ordinarily be decided by the 
supervisor on the ground, the professionalization of human resources might 
now require that every such request be processed formally through their 
system and discussed through a privacy lens on behalf of the individual 
employee. Ironically, while compliance and human resource departments 
have expanded, there is often a mismatch between expertise and authority. 
By professionalizing compliance with the ADA and removing discretion at 
the local supervisory level, HR may have counterintuitively incurred costs 
and imposed greater administrative burdens that deter employees from 
pursuing and securing reasonable accommodations. 
II. THE LOGIC OF PRIVACY 
Part II explains why some legal scholars have called for greater privacy as 
a prophylaxis for contemporary forms of discrimination.90 The argument that 
privacy advances individual liberties is well developed outside of the 
disability space and regularly imported into the disability context.91 Alan 
Westin, one of the early theorists on privacy law (pre-internet) framed 
privacy as control.92 Other proponents of privacy frame privacy as an interest 
held by the individual to control information as a way of controlling access to 
their lives; others emphasize the importance of privacy to the development 
of meaningful social relationships. Some scholars argue, therefore, that 
 
89 See Julia Borggraefe, Human Resources Governance and Compliance: Introduction and Overview, 
in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1051, 1056-57 (Matthias Zeuch ed., 2016) 
(“If HR therefore is responsible for creating HR compliance standards, HR also must be empowered 
to instruct executives and to conduct consequences in case the rules have not been complied with. 
Rules have to be binding and people—be it employees or executives—must be aware of this.”). 
90 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information 
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 56 & n.27 (2016) (listing scholars advocating 
for privacy protections in antidiscrimination laws but challenging blanket reliance on privacy); 
Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1533-36 (2011) (highlighting the absence of protections in federal 
antidiscrimination law for marital and parental status); Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old 
Problem, New Tactic: Making the Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on 
Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1465-66 (2007) (calling for federal law that explicitly 
proscribes discrimination on the basis of family status). 
91 A detailed discussion about privacy debates among legal scholars is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, the arguments advanced in this Article contribute to the broader debates by 
offering an anomaly—disability. 
92 WESTIN, supra note 39, at 22-24; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 815, 836 (2000) (mapping privacy along a continuum with “liberal” at one end 
representing privacy as individual control over personal information). 
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information control better serves the exercise of meaningful decisional 
agency for individuals. 
More recent privacy scholarship, such as the work of Anita Allen, explores 
the “politics of sensitive data.”93 Allen describes the absence of “racial 
privacy” and argues that race does not receive the same legal protections 
afforded health, education, or financial data and questions the reasoning for 
its exclusion from formal legal protection.94 Rather than ban racial 
identification to help redress a history of racial subordination, indignity, and 
denial of fundamental rights, Allen states, U.S. law requires classification 
based on race.95 However, strong privacy protections for racial data in a 
remedial system requiring statistical proof of disparate impact, for example, 
may undermine broader goals of antidiscrimination law.96 
Disability antidiscrimination scholars, building on this broader privacy 
literature, often advance four interrelated arguments in support of data 
privacy: self-determination, avoidance of disability stigma, algorithmic 
discrimination, and the imperfections of our current antidiscrimination safety 
net to remedy implicit and institutional biases. 
A. Self-Determination and Decisional Autonomy 
While some scholars assert a utilitarian view of privacy, others adopt a 
deontological position, arguing that privacy is critical for self-determination 
and self-care, both foundational components of the formation of the 
contemporary liberal subject.97 Accordingly, some health and disability law 
scholars take a very aggressive position on privacy in the disability context. 
Professor Jessica Roberts, for example, astutely ties privacy law to 
antidiscrimination law, arguing that these two areas tend to be siloed given 
the focus of the former on individual autonomy and the latter on equality of 
groups.98 The appeal of privacy law as part of the disability antidiscrimination 
 
93 ALLEN, supra note 36, at 123-24; see also Anita L. Allen, Race, Face, and Rawls, 72 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1677, 1683-86 (2004) (“Government should not act so as to call attention to facts on record 
about a person [such as race] that will result in the person’s being an object of perhaps unwanted, 
perhaps negative scrutiny.”). 
94 ALLEN, supra note 36, at 124. 
95 Id. at 125. 
96 For an interesting discussion of racial privacy in the context of tax law, see Jeremy Bearer-
Friend, Should the IRS Know Your Race?: The Challenge of Colorblind Tax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1, 37 
(2019), which argues that the IRS’s colorblind data collection undermines broader equity goals 
because it fails to capture the ways tax policies have disparate impacts on racial minorities. 
97 See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 189 (2008). 
98 See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee 
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2019) (arguing that privacy norms and legislation promote 
antidiscrimination); Roberts, supra note 6, at 2099-103 (calling for privacy and health law to come 
together as a means of promoting antidiscrimination). Professor Roberts’s work has focused on the 
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agenda, she argues, centers on two main points. First, privacy law is 
administratively simpler to enforce than a more complex and nuanced system 
of disclosure.99 Second, strict privacy protections are preemptive, meaning 
that a potential plaintiff does not wait for harm to actualize before bringing a 
claim.100 This, of course, works only when the disfavored identity trait can be 
masked or is not immediately apparent. Even scholars who might have 
historically questioned privacy are now more skeptical given the explosion of 
big data mining and algorithmic discrimination that seeks to make decisions 
based on select variables about a person’s life, behavior, and history. These 
scholars, as a result, tend toward more explicit and comprehensive data 
protection for individuals as a shield against discrimination, particularly in 
the workplace.101 
Other scholars, serious about the dangers of disclosure of disability, call 
for heightened tort protections as a way to supplement existing 
antidiscrimination laws. For example, greater recognition of the tort of 
invasion of privacy might offer greater employee protection for misuse of 
genetic information by employers.102 Broader tort liability may also enhance 
the dignity of people with disabilities (especially disabled people of color) as 
they are often the subject of state policing and surveillance.103 
B. Avoidance of Disability Stigma 
Second, identification as a disabled person has subjected people with 
disabilities to inexplicable privacy invasions including involuntary 
 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and has framed GINA as an 
antidiscrimination statute because of the privacy protections in place. See, e.g., id. at 2101. 
99 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 2121 (“Because [antidiscrimination laws] simply prohibit 
decisions based on protected status, they do not seek to prevent the preceding differentiation or 
value assignment that makes those decisions possible.”). 
100 See id. (“Privacy law has the power to cut the process of discrimination short.”). 
101 See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. 
L. REV. 735, 738-39, 772 (2017) (arguing that current laws are generally insufficient to guard against 
intrusive worker surveillance, the product of new technologies and the decreased costs of surveillance). 
102 See William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. 
L. REV. 91, 154 (2003) (“Regarding genetic discrimination, tort theory could augment the coverage 
already provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act and state genetic discrimination laws.”); see 
also Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination 
Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693 (1996) (discussing common law claims brought in cases also alleging 
violations of various civil rights statutes). In fact, several cases allege violations of the ADA’s 
confidentiality provisions and secondary claims for invasion of privacy under state tort law. 
103 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of 
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1999) (“The intentional torts are not the only tort causes 
of action that protect dignitary interests. The torts of invasion of privacy and defamation do so as 
well.”); see also Jane Bowling, Workplaces Fraught with Potential for Invasions of Privacy, Panel Finds, 
DAILY REC. (Balt.), June 17, 1996, at 17 (suggesting that employers increasingly face invasion of 
privacy suits if they reveal medical information about employees with disabilities). 
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sterilization and medical testing;104 continuous surveillance by the state, 
medical providers, and support personnel; and the denial of decisional 
agency.105 This recent history offers strong incentives for those without the 
aesthetic markers to cover or pass as nondisabled and avoid the consequences 
of disability stigma in social and professional interactions.106 The legislative 
history of the ADA, for example, highlights the impossible dilemma facing 
people with less apparent disabilities: “I wish to remind you that many of us 
have hidden disabilities. We often risk discrimination by the very act of 
disclosing our disability. Once disclosure is risked, we have little recourse 
when denial of accommodation and exclusion occur.”107 
In this sense, privacy law and policies insulate people with less visible 
disabilities from public scrutiny and prejudice.108 When given a choice to 
disclose or not, even if it means forgoing legally mandated reasonable 
accommodations, a person capable of covering or passing as nondisabled has 
good reason to seek the protection of self-accommodation and nondisclosure. 
Erving Goffman’s classic work on stigma details how these social relations 
play out and how they limit the life choices of those subject to the explicit 
and implicit negative attitudes of others.109 
C. Algorithmic Discrimination 
Third, nondisclosure of disability may avoid certain forms of algorithmic 
discrimination. Even when a person chooses not to disclose in the workplace, 
the ability to be selectively “out” in one’s social life is increasingly difficult. 
Machine-learning (and other artificial intelligence tools (AI)) allow 
 
104 Harris, supra note 2, at 919-20. 
105 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY: HOW 
GUARDIANSHIP AND ALTERNATIVES IMPACT THE AUTONOMY OF PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL 
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 72-73 (2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Turning-
Rights-into-Reality_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TM4-9XJM] (describing how people with 
intellectual and developmental disabilities experience “a regression of their decision-making abilities” 
after a guardian is appointed). 
106 GOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 102-04. 
107 Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988 Before the Subcomm. 
on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 100th Cong. 80 (1988) (statement of Marcie Roth, 
Supervising Advocate, WE CAHR). 
108 See, e.g., J. Alexander Short, Opinion, Stopping Stigma: The Necessity of Privacy Protections, 
PATRIOT-NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.pennlive.com/opinion/2020/02/stopping-stigma-the-
necessity-of-privacy-protections-opinion.html [https://perma.cc/WR4R-MJMN] (“Unlike many 
other diseases, disclosure of [substance use disorder] regularly invokes unique repercussions. 
Whether it be the loss of parental rights, employment, housing, or insurance, the stakes are 
incredibly high. As such, protecting the privacy of such disclosures is imperative for this population 
to access healthcare without the devastating fear of negative repercussions.”). 
109 See GOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 104 (“[T]he hard of hearing learn to talk with the degree of loudness 
that listeners feel is appropriate . . . . [T]he blind sometimes learn to look directly at the speaker . . . .”). 
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institutional actors to amass consumer data that can identify individuals as 
disabled without their knowledge or consent.110 
Predictive algorithms focused on “safety” or “dangerousness” present 
similar challenges. After the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, for 
instance, Governor Rick Scott signed the “Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public 
Safety Act,” a “red flag” law, which, among other provisions, directs the 
Florida Department of Education to work with the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement and create a “centralized integrated data repository and 
data analytics resources.”111 This repository collects data on students with 
mental disabilities and behavioral problems, among others, whom public 
agencies think are potential school safety risks. The types of information 
populating the database include “Good Samaritan” reports, state and local 
sources such as social media, district special education records, the 
Department of Children and Families, the Department of Law Enforcement, 
the Department of Juvenile Justice, and records from local law enforcement.112 
Government agencies and private contractors argue that there is a significant 
need to share confidential information quickly and, in emergency situations, 
they should be exempt from potential violations of federal and state privacy 
and education confidentiality laws.113 Civil liberty groups such as the 
Southern Poverty Law Center and the Florida chapter of the American Civil 
Liberties Union have raised concerns about erroneous predictions of risk and 
future violence that will negatively and disproportionately affect students 
with disabilities and those with disciplinary records who also are 
disproportionately male students of color.114 
 
110 Mason Marks, Algorithmic Disability Discrimination, in DISABILITY, HEALTH, LAW AND 
BIOETHICS 242, 242 (I. Glenn Cohen, Carmel Shachar, Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein eds., 2020) 
(“In the past, disability-related information flowed between people with disabilities and their doctors, 
family members, and friends. However, AI-based tools . . . allow corporations . . . to bypass the laws 
protecting people with disabilities and infer consumers’ disabilities without their knowledge or consent.”). 
111 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, ch. 2018-3, § 21, 2018 Fla. Laws 6, 40. 
112 Id. The public discourse on mental and psychosocial disabilities, despite sound data to the 
contrary, continues to tie mental illness to violence, particularly gun violence. Jonathan M. Metzl & 
Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 240, 247 (2015). 
113 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. 
114 See What Does the “Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act” Mean for Students?, 
ACLU FLA., https://www.aclufl.org/en/what-does-marjory-stoneman-douglas-high-school-public-safety-
act-mean-students [https://perma.cc/MU2Y-GCAJ] (highlighting increased youth arrests and disparate 
treatment of minorities as risks); Greg Allen, Florida Could Serve as Example for Lawmakers Considering Red 
Flag Laws, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752815318/florida-could-serve-
as-example-for-lawmakers-considering-red-flag-laws [https://perma.cc/7ZT8-UT7R] (discussing Florida’s 
red flag laws as examples for other states). Consider the effects of other identities such as class or 
immigration status on listing in the database. 
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Categorical nondisclosure, therefore, prevents inadvertent secondary 
disclosure and, as such, may permit the individual ongoing control of the 
information to make select disclosures as desired. In an age of data mining, 
sharing, and AI, however, the ability to control information about one’s 
identity gets harder each day.115 For this reason, scholars equate privacy with 
dignity, autonomy, and stigma avoidance, even going so far as to frame 
privacy as a human right for people with disabilities.116 
D. The Imperfections of Existing Antidiscrimination Laws 
The prevalence of disability bias in society, according to some disability 
law scholars, demands a strong privacy preference to prevent 
discrimination.117 Consider the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) statistics tracking complaints filed correlating with 
type of disability. The EEOC data reflect the prevalence of less visible 
disabilities among EEOC complaints, suggesting that, “at least in getting 
hired, the apparent absence of disability makes a difference.”118 
Privacy laws, then, on balance, may be a more direct remedy for misuse of 
disability information than existing antidiscrimination laws that impose 
onerous burdens of proof that do not mirror contemporary forms of 
discrimination. For example, aggrieved plaintiffs need only show that the 
disability related information was either wrongfully obtained (without consent) 
or improperly disseminated. Privacy laws, in this respect, may better redress 
discrimination that is not captured by our equality laws. The prime example 
here is the difficulty of proving intent and causation in antidiscrimination laws, 
creating particular challenges for responding to unconscious biases. Privacy 
laws may avoid the challenge of investigating intent by engaging in a relatively 
 
115 See Carsten Maple, Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things, 2 J. CYBER POL’Y 155, 155 
(2017) (“The growth in the number of devices and the speed of that growth presents challenges to 
our security and freedoms . . . .”). 
116 See, e.g., Jonathan Lazar, Brian Wentz & Marco Winckler, Information Privacy and Security 
as a Human Right for People with Disabilities, in DISABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 199, 202 (Jonathan Lazar & Michael Ashley Stein eds., 2017) (stating that the 
“human right to information privacy and security is critical for persons with disabilities” and thus 
framing privacy as a human right for people with disabilities). 
117 See Areheart & Roberts, supra note 98, at 710 (contending that privacy protection promotes 
antidiscrimination); Roberts, supra note 6, at 2099-2103. 
118 Mark C. Weber, Privacy Protection and Disability Discrimination in a Social Context 2 
(2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also ADA Charge Data by Impairment/Bases 
– Resolutions (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 – FY 2019, U.S. EQUAL EMP. COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-resolutions.cfm [https://perma.cc/4NCE-
PA9R] (presenting EEOC resolution statistics which show that those with less apparent disabilities 
consistently file the most complaints). 
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“straightforward factual inquiry” into whether a defendant attempted to obtain 
certain kinds of protected information.119 
The ADA provides protection against preemployment conditional-offer 
medical exams and inquiries and limits post-employment examinations and 
inquiries.120 These protections provided innovative solutions to disability 
discrimination at the hiring stage and, undoubtedly, have helped prevent 
discrimination in employment in many cases. However, some disability 
scholars remain skeptical that these provisions offer meaningful protection 
against disability discrimination in an age of big data.121 The use of predictive 
algorithms in employment settings weighs heavily against disclosure, 
particularly at the hiring stage, when the ADA is perhaps least effective at 
combating disability discrimination. 
III. PRIVACY NORMS AS ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
The understanding that disability identity was and, normatively, should 
be a private matter continues to shape disability rights today. The law nudges 
privacy in two ways. Sometimes the law explicitly states that information 
about a person’s disability ought to be kept private. Other times, the law offers 
remedies that focus on the “harmful” consequences of disclosure. While 
modern iterations of privacy are not always direct shoves into the disability 
closet as they were during state-sponsored eugenics and institutionalization, 
contemporary disability law tips the scales in favor of covering and passing, 
for those who can do so, rather than creating the conditions for publicly 
claiming disability identity. This section offers some examples of privacy 
nudges operating in disability, procedural, education, and tort law.122 
A. Disability Antidiscrimination Law 
I will discuss three main examples of privacy nudges in disability 
antidiscrimination law: (1) the ADA definition of disability, (2) the tension 
between disclosure and confidentiality provisions under the ADA, and (3) the 
 
119 Roberts, supra note 6, at 2154. 
120 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), (4); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13 (2020). 
121 Areheart & Roberts, supra note 98, at 764 (citing Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the 
Future of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2018, at 3, 6) (“Of course, 
in the age of big data, when employers can access information through a variety of sources other 
than medical examinations and inquiries, the ADA’s privacy protections look obsolete.”); see also 
Sharon Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 786-88 
(2017) (describing the ADA’s shortcomings with big data). 
122 Not all disability rights laws advance only privacy norms. Rather, this Part shows how some 
of the key celebrated aspects of these laws use privacy as part of their remedial mechanisms. 
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treatment of disability identity as proprietary under the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (Rehab Act). 
1. The ADA Definition of Disability 
First, courts have struggled with the intended scope of coverage of the 
ADA which is, in part, a reflection of misperceptions about the incidence of 
disability in society and the scope of Congress’s intended protection. The 
ADA defines a person with a disability as a person having a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; a 
person with a record of such an impairment; or someone regarded as having 
such an impairment.123 The first eighteen years of the ADA cultivated judicial 
backlash as courts wrestled with the threshold category of disability and who 
could claim standing to sue under the ADA.124 In 1999, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in three cases—the Sutton trilogy125—seeking clarity on the 
legal definition of disabled under the ADA, specifically, the definition of 
“substantially limits” used to define “disability” under the statute.126 
This question required the Court to determine whether Congress 
intended to include in the definition of disability those individuals who could 
employ “mitigating measures”—defined as medication, assistive technology 
or other ameliorative devices.127 If an individual self-accommodated and it 
 
123 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
124 See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, 
in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 62, 65-66 (Linda 
Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (“Judges view the ADA as a form of public benefit program for people 
with disabilities, rather than as a mandate for equality.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—
Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7 (2000) (describing a “powerful narrowing trend in the federal 
judiciary, especially on the foundational question of who was a ‘person with a disability’ entitled to 
protection under the Act”). 
125 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999) (holding that the determination of 
disability under the ADA should be made considering an individual’s ability to mitigate the current 
impairment through corrective measures, which accords with the statutory language and history of 
the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (citing Sutton to hold that 
the determination of disability under the ADA is made considering available mitigating 
circumstances); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563-66 (1999) (holding that not all 
physical difficulties render an individual per se “disabled” under the ADA, but that disability is proven 
on an individual basis showing that an alleged disability substantially impacts a major life activity). 
126 The ADA as promulgated by Congress in 1990 defined disability as an “impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
127 Examples of such measures include: 
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices (which 
do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and 
devices, hearing aids and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices, 
mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;(II) use of assistive 
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worked, but still experienced discrimination in the workplace on the basis of 
an actual, prior, or perceived disability, the Supreme Court held, Congress 
intended to exclude him from the legal definition of disability. The expressive 
value of these holdings signaled a pervasive public distrust with disability and 
a desire to ensure limited remedial access to those with “legitimate” 
disabilities, defined by the Supreme Court as unassimilable impairments, 
those a disabled person could not self-accommodate to achieve “normalcy.”128 
Congress promulgated the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in direct 
response to the Sutton trilogy  and instructed federal courts (especially, the 
highest court) to adopt a broad interpretation of the definition of disability 
in accordance with its original statutory intent.129 The ADAAA also reiterates 
Congress’s intent to remedy what it deemed to be the core of disability 
discrimination: negative stereotypes of deficit and incapacity (and not always 
overt animus) that permeated all areas of interaction and association with 
disability. This insight is clearest in the “regarded as” prong of the definition 
of disability which extends protection under the ADA to people without 
actual or records of impairments who nevertheless face discrimination based 
on a perception that they have a disability.130 
2. The Tension Between Disclosure and Confidentiality 
Second, the ADA sets up an awkward tension between disclosure and 
privacy. The baseline rule is that employers “shall not make inquiries of an 
employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as 
to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry 
is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”131 In 
addition, Congress designed the process for requesting reasonable 
accommodations under Title I of the ADA to be interactive. “In many 
instances, both the disability and the type of accommodation required will be 
obvious, and thus there may be little or no need to engage in any discussion.”132 
 
technology; (III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or (IV) 
learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications. 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i). 
128 See e.g., Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519 (describing the petitioner as someone who “can function 
normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do” (quoting Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996))). 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note (“The purposes of this Act . . . are . . . to reject the requirement 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its 
companion cases . . . .”). 
130 Id. § 12101(a)(2), (8). 
131 Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
132 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2003-1 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
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The ADA streamlines the process for individuals who manifest the aesthetics 
of disability and instructs employers to presume statutory eligibility. Those 
without visible markers of disability, however, must undergo a process of 
proving eligibility by litigating the existence of a covered disability. 
To obtain a reasonable accommodation in the workplace under Title I for 
those with less apparent disabilities, a person must first request an 
accommodation by disclosing their disability.133 When the disability is “not 
obvious” an employer may ask the individual for “reasonable documentation” 
about functional limitations and the ability to perform the “essential functions” 
of the position.134 Conversely, an employer may violate Title I if she requests 
documentation of a disability when “both the disability and need for reasonable 
accommodation are obvious,”135 further demarcating the line between legitimate 
disabilities (those who bear the markers) and those who have to perform socially 
constructed perceptions of disability to access rights. The EEOC’s guidance 
explains that “[t]he employer is entitled to know that the individual has a covered 
disability for which s/he needs a reasonable accommodation.”136 
Legal doctrine signals that disclosure is potentially costly. For example, if 
an employee voluntarily discloses disability outside of the reasonable 
accommodations process and the employer learns about it, the employee may 
lose certain legal protections, such as the presumed confidentiality of that 
information, which may damage the employee’s case for disability 
discrimination under the ADA. In Rohan v. Networks Presentation LLC, the 
plaintiff claimed she was forced to disclose to her co-workers her mental 
impairment, history of trauma, and treatment in violation of the ADA’s 
confidentiality provisions.137 The court held that because the disclosure was 
voluntary and not the result of a medical exam or inquiry initiated the 
employer, the ADA did not mandate confidentiality.138 Rohan discourages 
disclosure because the person making such disclosure lacks the ability to 
control subsequent (and perhaps unintended) use of the information. 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held, in EEOC v. Thrivent Financial for 
Lutherans, that disability related information voluntarily disclosed by an 
employee to an employer outside of a former medical inquiry did not preclude 
the former employer from providing this information to other potential 
 
DISABILITIES ACT (2002) (emphasis added), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html 
[https://perma.cc/XA88-B7HH] [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (defining “essential function” as a “fundamental duty” of a position). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (emphasis added). 
137 175 F. Supp. 2d 806, 813 (D. Md. 2001). 
138 Id. at 808, 813-14. 
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employers as part of a reference check.139 The EEOC argued that the 
defendant, Thrivent, revealed information about plaintiff Messier’s migraine 
condition to prospective employers in violation of the ADA’s confidentiality 
requirement.140 “The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s 
migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry.”141 
Therefore, the confidentiality provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) did not 
apply, and Thrivent had no duty to treat knowledge of Messier’s migraine 
condition as a confidential medical record in accordance with the ADA.142 
The ADA prohibits employers from making preemployment inquiries 
about disability, recognizing the difficulty in building a failure to hire claim 
as discussed above. People with more apparent disabilities, such as wheelchair 
users, may choose to disclose disability preemployment to ensure that the 
interview itself, if in person, is accessible. Similarly, a deaf person or someone 
with low hearing may disclose disability to ensure the availability of 
interpretation services. The EEOC agency guidance permits employers in 
the preemployment process, if a disability is obvious, known, or voluntarily 
disclosed, to ask the applicant if she requires a reasonable accommodation.143 
But consider a blind applicant’s initial interview. Although disability is likely 
the elephant in the room and, in some cases, highly visible to the employer, 
the employer’s risk aversion may prevail and dissuade the employer from 
asking about the need for reasonable accommodations. This leaves the 
employer to imagine the accommodations needed (and costs attached) and 
the blind person to wonder what effect a cane or other aesthetic markers will 
have on her chances of getting the job. 
For some less visible disabilities, a person may not disclose at all because 
of concerns about bias at the hiring stage and the difficulty of proving that 
disability discrimination was the “but for” cause of the employer’s failure to 
 
139 700 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 2012). 
140 Id. at 1046; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (requiring employers to treat information about an 
employee obtained from “medical examinations and inquiries” “as a confidential medical record”). 
141 Thrivent, 700 F.3d at 1046. 
142 Id. Similarly, in Hannah P. v. Coats, the Fourth Circuit held that because the employee 
voluntarily disclosed her depression diagnosis to her supervisors, she could not sustain a claim 
against her employer for breach of confidentiality of medical information under the Rehabilitation 
Act, part of her antidiscrimination claims. 916 F.3d 327, 340 (4th Cir. 2019) (“The Rehabilitation 
Act does not protect information shared voluntarily.”). The court reasoned that, in fact, the 
employee voluntarily shared information about her depression diagnosis with at least four of her 
supervisors and admitted to such in her interrogatory responses. Id.; see also Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l 
Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding the district court properly granted summary 
judgment on a confidentiality claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act because the record “clearly 
show[ed]” that the appellant “disclosed his medical condition voluntarily”). 
143 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 132. Anything that could reasonably justify an 
employer’s reasonable belief that the person has a disability suffices. See id. 
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hire.144 In fact, “[i]f an individual’s disability or need for reasonable 
accommodation is not obvious, and s/he refuses to provide the reasonable 
documentation requested by the employer, then s/he is not entitled to 
reasonable accommodation.”145 Congress heard testimony from affected 
individuals leading up to the ADA: 
[Tricia,] a bright young woman was interviewed for a position with a financial 
institution and was told that she could give notice to her present employer. 
The woman who interviewed her was to call Tricia with a starting date. Tricia 
decided to disclose that she had [multiple sclerosis]. Although Tricia was 
initially told that it made no difference, the woman who interviewed her 
failed to call with a starting date. When Tricia called to find out what had 
happened, she was told that someone else would be hired for the position. 
The lady who interviewed Tricia admitted that she had been denied the job 
because she had multiple sclerosis.146 
Now add the confidentiality provisions of the ADA that limit disclosure. 
Except under narrowly prescribed circumstances, employers must collect and 
maintain any information about disability—including medical records, results 
of medical examinations, or medical history of the employee, and requests for 
reasonable accommodations—separate from the general employee files and 
treat this information “as a confidential medical record.”147 There is a 
disincentive for employers to request information about disability because of 
its association with medical data and their fear of incurring liability under the 
ADA, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), and other 
privacy protections.148 
 
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded . . . .”). 
145 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 132. 
146 Hearing on H.R. 2273, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. 
of the Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 101st Cong. 1802-03 (1989) (statement by JoAnn L. Shanks, Chapter 
Services and Equipment Coordinator, Indiana State Chapter, National Multiple Sclerosis Society). 
147 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (2020). Notable exceptions include: information shared with 
supervisors and managers regarding restrictions and necessary accommodations on a need-to-know 
basis; first aid and safety personnel in an emergency; and government officials investigating 
compliance with the employer’s responsibilities under the ADA and regulations. Id. 
148 For example, one district court held that a jury could hear such evidence that an employer 
breached its confidentiality requirements under the ADA by asking an employee to provide a 
doctor’s note after missing work. Stark v. Hartt Transp. Sys., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 3d 445, 450, 452-55 
(D. Me. 2014). But see Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 255 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that such 
a policy did not violate the Rehabilitation Act or the Constitution because “there is no evidence that 
this inquiry is intended to reveal or necessitates revealing a disability”). 
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3. Treatment of Disability Identity as Proprietary Under the Rehab Act 
Third, the Department of Labor (DOL), the organization responsible for 
regulating federal contractors’ compliance with Section 503149 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, treats disability identity as proprietary information 
belonging to the federal contractor. Section 503 and its implementing 
regulations require that federal contractors take “affirmative action to recruit, 
hire, promote, and retain” individuals with disabilities, with a goal of 
employing seven percent individuals with disabilities.150 However, the DOL 
asserts that the number of people with disabilities hired by each federal 
contractor (in aggregate form without personally identifiable information) is 
not subject to public inspection.151 The DOL requires federal contractors to 
maintain detailed employment records that are subject to periodic compliance 
audits.152 Specifically, federal contractors are required to record: 
(1) The number of applicants who self-identified as individuals with disabilities 
. . . or who are otherwise known to be individuals with disabilities; (2) [t]he 
total number of job openings and total number of jobs filled; (3) [t]he total 
number of applicants for all jobs; (4) [t]he number of applicants with disabilities 
hired; and (5) [t]he total number of applicants hired.153 
If the federal government and its contractors assert that publication of the 
very numbers required to assess compliance with Section 503 is exempted 
from public scrutiny, then how can the public know whether contractors 
comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory authority?154 This is 
 
149 See generally Section 503, OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm [https://perma.cc/G8SL-URNS]. 
150 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.45(a) (2019) (“[Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs] has 
established a utilization goal of 7 percent for employment of qualified individuals with disabilities 
for each job group in the contractor’s workforce, or for the contractor’s entire workforce . . . .”). 
151 Letter from Jane Suhr, Reg’l Dir., Off. of Fed. Cont. Compliance Programs, Pac. Reg’l Off., 
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Jasmine E. Harris, Professor, Univ. of Cal. Davis Sch. of L. 1 (June 19, 2019) 
(on file with author) (writing in response to and describing information requested in a May 29, 2019 
Harris Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request as “business confidential information” subject 
to the trade secret exception for FOIA requests). These claims to privacy also come after the Obama 
Administration directed the DOL to establish a default of disclosure and publication. See 
Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“All 
agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to 
the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government.”); see also Jamillah 
Bowman Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1684, 1688 (2019) (noting President 
Obama’s guidance to the DOL). 
152 29 U.S.C. § 793; 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.44(k) (2019). 
153 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.44(k) (2019) (emphasis added). 
154 Imagine if the Department of Education refused to publish aggregate education data on 
public school compliance with federal education and special education laws on the same grounds. 
Note that Vocational Rehab (VR) programs, or supported employment, explicitly require disclosure 
because employers work with the VR specialist on hiring and setting up accommodations. Susan G. 
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especially problematic because of Section 503’s remedial mission to address 
the unemployment and underemployment of people with disabilities in the 
formal economy.155 
B. Procedural Law 
Contrary to our tradition of public adjudication, many disability-related 
proceedings unfold in informal spaces outside of public view because of a 
belief that the subject matter (disability) is itself embarrassing or 
stigmatizing, and that there is no public interest in disability related 
proceedings.156 First, consider closed probate proceedings to appoint a 
conservator and restrict an individual’s decisional autonomy. In some 
jurisdictions, not only are these proceedings closed to the public, but there is 
no requirement that the subject of the proceedings be physically present.157 
The public interest in transparency in these cases is high given repeated 
allegations of conservator abuse and overly broad grants of plenary 
conservatorship. Plenary conservatorships remain the default in many 
jurisdictions, effectively removing all decisional authority from the 
conservatee. This includes personal choices about where to live, how to 
allocate finances, or with whom to associate.158 Even certain jurisdictions that 
have open probate proceedings and publish probate decisions online generally 
 
Goldberg, Mary B. Killeen & Bonnie O’Day, The Disclosure Conundrum: How People with Psychiatric 
Disabilities Navigate Employment, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 463, 467 (2005). 
155 According to the Department of Labor, the 2019 unemployment rate of people with 
disabilities was over seven percent. Office of Disability Employment Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 
2021), https://www.dol.gov/odep [https://perma.cc/NK49-JLXR]; see also Martha Ross and Nicole 
Bateman, Only Four out of Ten Working-Age Adults with Disabilities Are Employed, BROOKINGS (July 
25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/07/25/only-four-out-of-ten-working-
age-adults-with-disabilities-are-employed [https://perma.cc/HGK6-YH8N](“Only 40 percent of 
adults with disabilities in their prime working years (age 25-54) have a job, compared to 79 percent 
of all prime-age adults.”) 
156 See, e.g., J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196, 200-01 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding in 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act appeal that information about disability in the case is “a 
matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature” warranting deviation from strong norms of 
publicity in context of adjudication (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Waterfront Emps. v. Chao, 587 F. Supp. 
2d 90, 99 (D.D.C. 2008))); see also Harris, supra note 6, at 526. While it is true that some adjudicative 
spaces may be open to the public, the norm is privacy with the decision held, in theory, by the person 
with a disability. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56501(c)(2) (Deering 2021) (stating that parents have 
the right to decide to open special education hearings with a default of closed proceedings). 
157 See, e.g., In re Mental Health of L. K., 184 P.3d 353, 360-61 (Mont. 2008) (detailing a case 
in which a committee appeared from a hospital and had her microphone periodically muted during 
her commitment hearing). 
158 Supported Decision Making & The Problems of Guardianship, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/disability-rights/integration-and-autonomy-people-
disabilities/supported-decision-making [https://perma.cc/B3VT-PXME]. 
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remove litigation documents that deal with conservatorship for people with 
disabilities on privacy grounds.159 
Second, civil commitment hearings in many jurisdictions continue to be 
informal and closed to the public based on privacy concerns despite being 
“quasi-criminal” in nature. Among other questions, the judge must decide 
whether the person is a threat to self or others to warrant involuntary 
commitment (or continued commitment) at a psychiatric hospital or other 
institution. The judge reviews mental health information and hears testimony 
from medical professionals, law enforcement officers (where applicable), 
family, and community members. The liberty interests at stake here weigh in 
favor of greater sunlight and procedural protections, not less. However, 
because these proceedings are also considered therapeutic and associated with 
medical treatment, courts tend to tip the scale in favor of greater privacy. 
Consider, for example, a recent opinion by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court holding that civil commitment hearings held in rooms at 
psychiatric hospitals did not violate due process even when the subject of 
those proceedings requested that the hearing be moved to open court to allow 
greater public participation.160 The lower court judge, in response to the 
respondent’s request that the proceedings be moved from a conference room 
in the hospital to municipal court, reminded the parties that “[t]hese 
proceedings are not open to the public. They are held here in a hearing[] 
room in the hospital where the public generally cannot walk into. They are 
conducted generally with the patient, attorneys, family members and needed 
security and medical personnel present.’”161 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, despite affirming 
the lower court’s finding that proceedings in the psychiatric facility did not 
violate due process, had a different view about the privacy of the hearings. 
Specifically, the court found that “[a]ll civil commitment hearings, wherever 
conducted, must be recorded and must operate as open, public proceedings. 
These protections are critical to ensuring that civil commitment hearings 
safeguard individuals’ rights to due process and equal access to the courts.”162 
The court noted that the record did not contain any evidence indicating that 
“members of the [general] public were prevented, or would have been 
prevented, from attending the civil commitment hearing” in the psychiatric 
 
159 Records, SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF ALAMEDA, 
http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/Pages.aspx/Court-Records-1-#Probate [https://perma.cc/JY3Y-
8NDD] (noting that probate case records are available online “except for conservatorships, 
guardianships and confidential documents”). 
160 In re M.C., 115 N.E.3d 546, 549 (Mass. 2019). 
161 Id. at 557 n.8. 
162 Id. at 549. 
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hospital.163 Here, health privacy laws such as HIPAA complicate the court’s 
desire to shift a well-established norm that proceedings held in hospitals are 
fundamentally private.164 It is hard to imagine how the hospital would 
publicize the day’s hearings and facilitate the flow of public traffic through an 
otherwise private, highly secured facility subject to medical privacy laws. 
Furthermore, the actual record from these civil commitment proceedings is 
not publicly available through legal databases or through public requests to 
the court even in redacted form. 
Third, procedural rules themselves operate at times to reinforce privacy 
norms. Federal, state, and court-specific rules perpetuate the view that 
disability information should be private, for example, by sealing documents 
in disability cases, masking the identity of disabled litigants with initials, and 
enforcing nondisclosure agreements in disability cases. These rules and 
practices, particularly sealing litigation documents and entering into 
nondisclosure agreements—not only protect bad actors (think Harvey 
Weinstein in the context of sexual assault) but also mask the structural 
problems and potential institutional remedies available. Professional 
responsibility rules require lawyers to represent clients’ interests and the 
client holds the waiver of confidentiality.165 When defendants use 
nondisclosure agreements as central points of negotiation that can make or 
break a settlement, this places many civil rights lawyers in a tough position 
between the needs of the individual client and the desire for promoting 
broader social reforms and deterring repeat bad actors.166 
C. Education Law 
Voluntary disclosure of disability is often thwarted by claims that privacy 
and education laws prohibit it even when the laws do not address this issue. 
As a policy matter, public schools (primary and secondary) are highly risk 
averse but not necessarily out of fear of violating applicable privacy laws 
regulating information on disability. More often, schools use privacy laws as 
a sword to enforce social norms of disability as deficient and stigmatizing, or, 
 
163 Id. at 557. 
164 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 526. 
165 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
166 Representatives from several disability rights organizations have conveyed to me that their 
impact litigation focuses on client education during pre-retention process to explain the value of 
publicity as it aligns with the broader mission of the organization. Cf. Written Testimony of Debra S. 
Katz, Partner and Hannah Alejandro, Senior Counsel Katz, Marshall & Banks LLP, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/written-testimony-debra-s-katz-partner-and-hannah-alejandro-senior-
counsel-katz-marshall-banks-llp [https://perma.cc/UYD9-6HMY] (discussing how nondisclosure 
agreements in the context of sexual harassment suits can be “harmful or beneficial to the degree that 
it respects the rights and autonomy of victims”). 
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paternalistically, in the best interests of young people to protect them against 
long-term risks associated with these social norms. Consider the following 
example. Eva and Madeline, two high school student editors, wanted to 
devote an issue of their school newspaper to the experiences of students with 
depression, including their own.167 The school administration, however, 
prevented publication, citing student privacy rights. Eva and Madeline 
wanted to use their own and other students’ actual names, with the consent 
of the students and their parents, as part of an effort to normalize mental 
disability among young people. The school administrators argued that 
disclosure would only lead to potential bullying, in the short term, and regret 
later in life168—for example, in college admissions and employment 
applications—because the students would lose control over this “damaging” 
information if published. Ultimately, Eva and Madeline published an opinion 
piece in the New York Times and received national attention for their efforts 
to destigmatize mental disability.169 Even after a public outpouring of 
support, however, the high school administration maintained its position 
against disclosure. 
What explains the school’s response to the possibility of publicity? School 
administrators regulated the disclosure of disability identity by framing their 
objections, in the first instance, as a violation of privacy, designed to protect 
confidential medical information.170 However, this framing conflates 
disability identity with private medical information and masks paternalistic 
overreaching. Interestingly, the school’s secondary objections used privacy as 
a favored prescription for disability discrimination, a way to protect the 
students who identified as people with mental and psychiatric disabilities 
from bullying, embarrassment, and bias, much like the arguments advanced 
by some disability rights scholars. The story illustrates the ways in which 
privacy regulates identity and, at times, can be misdirected to force people to 
be in the closet about their disabilities. The school’s response denied the 
students an opportunity for individual and collective “coming out” and the 
personal (and collective) benefits that publicity brings. 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), schools 
have an affirmative duty to locate and evaluate students with suspected 
 
167 Madeline Halpert & Eva Rosenfeld, Opinion, Depressed, but Not Ashamed, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/opinion/depressed-but-not-ashamed.html 
[https://perma.cc/G9AD-6TLH]. 
168 Id. 
169 Id.; see also, e.g., Susan Antilla, Let Teens Talk About Mental Illness, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/27/opinion/antilla-mental-illness/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/7CNB-KH7S] (May 27, 2014, 9:49 AM). 
170 Halpert & Rosenfeld, supra note 167; see also, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 526 (discussing 
the application of existing privacy laws). 
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disabilities who are eligible for special education services.171 Failure to 
identify can occur when the school knew or should have known about a 
potential disability. Like the employment context, if the student manifests 
the aesthetics of disability, the school is more likely to provide legally 
mandated services. 
This duty must be carried out without broader disclosure and in 
accordance with the educational rights holders’ (typically the parents’) 
entitlement to nondisclosure of disability-related information. Thus, only 
school administrators and teachers know which students who attend the 
school have disabilities and this information is available only if the students 
receive special education services or have a 504 plan.172 As the IDEA limits 
the provision of special education services to students with a disability that 
negatively affects their ability to access a “free appropriate public education” 
(FAPE),173 this is a much smaller percentage of the total number of students 
with disabilities in public schools. 
The IDEA incorporates and, at times, surpasses the protections offered 
by FERPA and HIPAA. All three privacy laws shroud disability in cloak of 
privacy by regulating disability identity as medical diagnoses.174 The IDEA 
also creates a “right to confidentiality of personally identifiable information” 
as a minimal procedural safeguard.175 Informed consent principles determine 
whether the confidentiality requirements have been violated.176 However, the 
message from federal and state education law is clear: disclosure should be on 
a “need to know basis” and solely for purposes of requesting accommodations 
because disclosure opens the individual to disability discrimination.177 
 
171 2o U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2020). 
172 Students with disabilities are not required to disclose their disabilities to anyone unless 
they request special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) or reasonable accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As part 
of the assessment process, schools obtain informed consent from the educational rights holder for 
special education services and from the individual with a disability seeking accommodations. 
Disability related information contained in a student’s official education “record” is also subject to 
the protections of the Family Educational Rights Protection Act (FERPA). See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 
1417(c); Catrone v. Miles, 160 P.3d 1204, 1212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[FERPA and IDEA’s] express 
statutory mandates recognize privacy interests in special education records.”). 
173 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2020). 
174 See 20 U.S.C. § 1417(c) (“The Secretary [of Education] shall take appropriate action . . . to 
ensure the protection of the confidentiality of any personally identifiable data, information, and 
records collected or maintained by the Secretary and by State educational agencies and local 
educational agencies . . . .”). 
175 Id. § 1439(a)(2). 
176 Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (2020) (defining “consent”). 
177 The Office of Disability Employment Policy at the Department of Labor explains: 
To whom do you disclose your disability? Generally, you should only disclose your 
disability to those individuals who have a need to know because of the accommodation 
process. You may consider disclosing to the program’s disability support service’s staff, 
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Taken to the extreme, these principles can nudge schools to be risk averse 
with respect to any discussion about disability. For example, one parent 
wanted to visit her child’s second grade classroom during disability awareness 
month178 and discuss, alongside her son, his experience with autism. She 
hoped to give the class opportunities to ask questions and move past staring 
or ignoring her son’s disability altogether. The son wanted to do this. The 
teacher said that the parent and son could not discuss his autism in class 
because it would reveal personal medical information and would risk bullying 
and other long-term discrimination. The school administration agreed with 
the classroom teacher, and the mother, instead, sent a non-specific book about 
autism to the school for the teacher to read to the class, losing an opportunity 
for potential norm shifts and engagement on disability. 
Once a young person advances to higher education, the IDEA no longer 
applies (the ADA and Rehab Act apply) and any request for accommodations 
looks more like the interactive process discussed above in employment 
settings under Title I of the ADA.179 Given the rising numbers of students 
with disabilities entering higher education, attention to accommodations is 
critical.180 Interestingly, the number of students with university-approved 
 
academic advisor, directly on your application, or to an admissions officer. Some 
programs discourage students with disabilities from disclosing directly to faculty and 
staff because of student confidentiality. It is a good idea to begin by disclosing to the 
disability support services office to learn what the specific procedures are for your 
program. 
OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP. POL’Y, THE WHY, WHEN, WHAT, AND HOW OF DISCLOSURE IN AN 
ACADEMIC SETTING, AFTER HIGH SCHOOL (2007), 
https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/76652/The_Why_When_What_and_How_of
_Disclosure_in_an_Academic_Setti.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/VS68-X4PN]. 
178 There is no one “disability pride” month, but all are siloed. Amanda Burris, 2020 Diversity, 
Inclusion and Disability Awareness Calendar, DISABILITY SOLS. (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.disabilitytalent.org/single-post/2019/12/31/2020-Diversity-Inclusion-Disability-
Awareness-2020Calendar [https://perma.cc/D28R-J6LZ]. For example, October is National 
Disability Employment Awareness Month, April is Autism Awareness Month, and November is 
Diabetes Awareness Month. Id. 
179 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, 
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 701(c)(1), (4), (5) (emphasizing principles of “respect for individual dignity, personal 
responsibility, self-determination, and pursuit of meaningful careers . . . of individuals with disabilities” 
and “support for involvement of an individual’s representative . . . and [the] community . . . .”). 
180 People with Disabilities and Postsecondary Education—Position Paper, NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/people-disabilities-and-postsecondary-education-
position-paper [https://perma.cc/NA3R-WDC6] (documenting rising numbers of students with 
disabilities in post-secondary education); see, e.g., Susan Grimes, Jill Scevak, Erica Southgate & Rachel 
Buchanan, Non-Disclosing Students with Disabilities or Learning Challenges: Characteristics and Size of a 
Hidden Population, 44 AUSTRALIAN EDUC. REP. 425, 427 (2017) (“International research has attempted 
to identify the true participation rates of the [students with disabilities] population and found that the 
population is significantly higher than institutional statistics indicate. In one US institution, 
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accommodations is inconsistent with university data on the number of 
students who anonymously and voluntarily identify as students with 
disabilities.181 “‘Disability’ is a stigmatised term and it is argued that few 
would [publicly] choose to associate themselves with the term for this 
reason.”182 Mental health, for example, is one of the fastest growing concerns 
students raise and yet there is very little discussion among students 
collectively and universities at the institutional level.183 Federal and state 
privacy laws that treat disability identity as medical data postpone the 
development of institutional designs to normalize disability and investigate 
opportunities for structural reforms. Instead, university discussions often 
focus on streamlining accommodations, enhancing student privacy, and 
providing more individual counseling services. 
D. Tort Law 
Tort law continues to treat disability as a negative “private fact” that 
causes reputational harm when disclosed.184 The expressive value of this legal 
 
[researchers] reported that 8.4% of students identified as disabled although less than one percent had 
disclosed to the institution.” (citing Susan L. Gabel & Maja Miskovic, Discourse and the Containment of 
Disabilities in Higher Education: An Institutional Analysis, 29 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 1145 (2014))). 
181 See Students with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=60 [https://perma.cc/GMV7-QXCW] (“Nineteen 
percent of undergraduates in 2015-16 reported having a disability.”). Notably, not all students with 
disabilities need accommodations. Similarly, some students who need accommodations choose not to 
use the formal accommodations process and prefer to work individually with professors to accommodate 
them ad hoc. In these cases, privacy may not be as big of an issue, or when weighed against the time 
consuming and uncertain process of formal accommodations, students choose to disclose to and directly 
negotiate with the professor. Some accommodations, however, like extended time on exams, may only 
be granted through the more formal accommodations process with a university’s disability center. See, 
e.g., Alternative Testing Process for Students, UNIV. OF WASH., 
https://depts.washington.edu/uwdrs/current-students/accommodations/alternative-testing 
[https://perma.cc/8REK-DMYW]. 
182 Grimes et al., supra note 180, at 428. 
183 See, e.g., College Students’ Mental Health Is a Growing Concern, Survey Finds, MONITOR ON PSYCH., 
June 2013, https://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/06/college-students [https://perma.cc/QQ9W-DEEA] 
(“Ninety-five percent of college counseling center directors surveyed said the number of students with 
significant psychological problems is a growing concern in their center or on campus.” (citing BRIAN J. 
MISTLER, DAVID R. REETZ, BRIAN KRYLOWICZ & VICTOR BARR, THE ASSOCIATION FOR 
UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE COUNSELING CENTER DIRECTORS ANNUAL SURVEY (2012))); see also 
College Students (And Their Parents) Face a Campus Mental Health ‘Epidemic,’ NPR (May 28, 2019, 2:44 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/727509438 [https://perma.cc/DZ2M-YGAE]. 
184 One Washington Supreme Court decision stated: 
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts about 
himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at 
most reveals only to his family or to close personal friends. Sexual relations, . . . family 
quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses . . . . 
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doctrine communicates to people with and without disabilities the benefits of 
privacy. Courts have considered publication of disability status under both 
defamation and invasion of privacy branches of privacy torts.185 Public 
disclosure of private facts generally requires that the fact (1) was publicized, 
(2) was a private fact, (3) that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person,”186 
and (4) is not of “legitimate concern” to the public.187 Failure to meet any one 
of these elements defeats the claim. Not only have courts repeatedly held that 
“disability” is a “private fact,” but many state courts have also held that 
information about disability generally meets the offensiveness or 
embarrassment element without the need for legal analysis.188 In Cordts v. 
 
Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977)). 
185 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-407 (1960) (reviewing existing 
cases on the invasion of privacy tort, organizing the cases into four categories ((1) intrusion; (2) 
public disclosure of private fact; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of the image 
or likeness of the person), and discussing the elements of proof of and available defenses to each). 
The Restatement, memorializing Prosser’s taxonomy, explains the elements of defamation: 
To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault 
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher [with respect to the act 
of publication]; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special 
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558. Public disclosure of private facts is the publication of 
the private affairs of another person when the disclosures would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person. See, e.g., Smith v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103588, at *19 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 19, 2008) (“Publicity means that a matter is communicated to the public at large or 
disseminated to so many people that it becomes public knowledge.” (citing Indus. Found. of So. v. 
Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683-84 (Tex. 1976))); see also Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N. 
P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing two modes of publicity: communicating 
to the public and communicating to a number of individuals large enough to be deemed 
communication to the public); see also Allen, Privacy Torts, supra note 37, at 1721 (analyzing privacy 
tort case law in the context of LGBT plaintiffs and showing how plaintiffs often advanced legal 
claims based on more than one features of Prosser’s privacy tort taxonomy). 
186 See Cordts v. Chi. Tribune Co., 860 N.E. 2d 444, 450-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“An invasion 
of a plaintiff ’s right to privacy is important if it exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge 
of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff.” (quoting Miller v. Motorola Inc., 560 N.E.2d 
900, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))). 
187 Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1199 (Cal. 2007) (outlining the elements of public disclosure of 
private facts to include that the private fact is not of legitimate public concern). Note that it is not necessary 
to prove malice unless punitive damages are sought. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 2021). 
188 See, e.g., Smith at *19 (“The matter publicized must relate to the plaintiff ’s private life. 
There is a presumption under Texas law that the public has no legitimate interest in private, 
embarrassing facts about private citizens.” (citations omitted). The court then proceeds to discuss 
whether the facts rise to the level of publication without engaging the question of disability as 
private. See also White v. Twp. of Winthrop, 116 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“The 
employer argues that the information disclosed [that the plaintiff has epilepsy] was not highly 
offensive.”) Cases from other jurisdictions involving publication of the intimate details of an 
employee’s medical health have met the “highly offensive” requirement. See Blackwell v. Harris 
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Chicago Tribune Co., for example, a plaintiff claimed that an employee of his 
benefits evaluator wrongfully disclosed his treatment to his ex-wife.189 Cordts 
asserted that the confidential information disclosed (about his depression) 
was of the kind that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and 
that the disclosure was especially devastating to him due to the “special 
relationship” he had with his ex-wife.190 
In another case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court 
ruling that disclosure of a law student’s disability accommodations did not 
involve a “private fact” that a reasonable person would find “offensive” if 
disclosed.191 The court reasoned that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the 
information disclosed by his law school regarding his accommodation “was 
not already public knowledge.”192 The lower court’s opinion focused, in part, 
on the fact that his disability was public when he failed to show up for the 
final exam with the rest of the class.193 However, his absence alone did not 
constitute an explicit public disclosure and could be explained by a number 
of other possible reasons. The Ninth Circuit offered another reason for why 
disclosure of disability accommodations met the statutory element of “private 
fact” whose revelation would be “highly offensive.” Specifically, the court of 
appeals noted that disclosure of accommodations might reveal medical 
information courts unquestionably consider “private facts,” such as medical 
diagnoses, once again reaching for health privacy laws, regulations, and norms 
to reduce disability identity to medical data.194 
Interestingly, courts hearing claims for improper disclosure of disability 
status tend to focus the least on the elements of disability as “private” 
information and its “embarrassing” nature, assuming this is common 
knowledge and these are established norms.195 “The right to privacy 
acknowledges that the reason a person wishes to keep his or her illness 
confidential is to avoid the pity [or rejection] that knowledge of such a disease 
 
Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding alleged disclosure of personal 
medical information to other employees sufficiently met elements of private facts tort). 
189 Cordts, 860 N.E.2d at 447. 
190 Id. 
191 Tecza v. Univ. of S.F., 532 F. App’x 667, 669 (9th Cir. 2013). 
192 Id. 
193 Tecza v. Univ. of S.F., 2010 WL 1838778, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2010). 
194  “[T]o the extent that [the University]’s disclosure indirectly revealed some underlying 
medical information—that Tecza likely had a disability and some additional information that might 
allow a person to make inferences about the general nature of Tecza’s disability—California courts 
have considered medical information to be a private fact.” Tecza, 532 F. App’x at 669 (citing Jeffrey 
H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 4th 345, 920-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)). 
195 Courts primarily focus on the “publication” of the private fact and whether it is of 
“legitimate concern” to the public. See, e.g., Leach v. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1339 
(S.D. Fla. 2017) (focusing on the publication element of invasion of privacy and assuming without 
explanation that disability is a “private fact” under state law). 
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would engender in others.”196 However, the law is not agnostic on this front. 
Failure to interrogate disability as negative, embarrassing, and pity inducing 
is highly normative and norm dependent.197 It requires a conception of able-
bodied as the preferred baseline such that one’s deviation from it inherently 
invokes shame or pity.198 
What constitutes a “private” fact under tort law is highly normative as well 
as norm reinforcing.199 Courts used to treat a person’s identity as gay as 
presumptively private information whose disclosure could cause 
embarrassment and reputational harm. State cases from the late 1970s and 
1980s illustrate how plaintiffs only had to show that one’s gay identity (and 
exposure to HIV) was made public without a requisite showing of actual 
damage because it was presumed harmful.200 Jenny Pizer of Lambda Legal 
Defense, for example, summarized the central problem: “It shouldn’t still be 
existing in the law that being gay is so horrible that when someone is falsely 
accused of it they don’t have to prove that it is damaging – that the accusation 
is seen as damaging on its face. People should have to prove that it’s bad.”201 If 
the category or identity is not something that normatively people would find 
 
196 White v. Twp. of Winthrop, 116 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
197 See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., Inc., 253 P.2d 441, , 445 (Cal. 1953) (discussing elements 
of a claim of invasion of the right of privacy including “portraying [something] to shock the ordinary 
sense of decency or propriety”).This criterion is undoubtedly relative to the “customs of the time 
and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.” 
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 588-89 (D.C. 1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977)); Harris ex rel. Harris v. Easton Publ’g 
Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (dicta). 
198 See, e.g., Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ’g Co., 326 So.2d 471, 474 (Miss. 1976) (“It is 
difficult to conceive that any information can be more delicate or private in nature than the fact that 
a child has limited mental capabilities or is in any sense mentally retarded.”). 
199 Plaintiffs bringing tort claims against defendants for publication of a private fact without 
consent, for example, must prove that the fact was “private” and one whose disclosure would be 
“embarrassing to a reasonable person,” either of which might be perceived to be a concession of the 
stigma and shame of the nonnormative identity. Plaintiffs also would make more public a fact about 
sexual identity and increase the potential harm of the disclosure all in service of remedying the 
“harmful” publication. 
200 See Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Colo. 1997) (recognizing the tort 
of invasion of privacy in a case involving a plaintiff who was an associate at a law firm, disclosed to 
the president and shareholder of the law firm that he was gay, that his partner had been diagnosed 
with AIDS, and that the associate needed to get tested immediately only to be fired the following 
week and have this information shared with several people at the firm). However, at least one study 
of the cases from the 1960s through the early 2000s shows that although gay plaintiffs reached for 
the privacy torts seeking injunctive relief and damages, they did not achieve the anticipated success. 
Allen, Privacy Torts, supra note 37, at 1723-33 (surveying the case law). 
201 DAVID EHRENSTEIN, OPEN SECRET: GAY HOLLYWOOD—1928-2000, at 152 (1st perennial 
ed. 2000). Jennifer C. Pizer is the Law and Policy Director for Lambda Legal, the oldest and largest 
national legal organization committed to achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people and people living with HIV. Jennifer C. Pizer, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
https://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/staff/jennifer-c-pizer [https://perma.cc/9FLG-GDPL]. 
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automatically harmful or bad, the question of whether it is a “private fact” 
should go to a jury. The question before the jury would be whether the nature 
of the statement was such that a reasonable person hearing it would think 
badly about the person of whom it was said. This inquiry is highly 
contextual,202 but courts largely skipped this step, almost taking judicial notice 
of the embarrassing nature of gay identity, then, and today, disability identity. 
Moreover, the common law tort doctrine related to “outing” nudged 
people to cover or pass as heterosexual or lose viable legal defenses.203 If a 
person who identified as LGB was in a public place displaying same-sex 
affection, they could not later claim an invasion of privacy tort because they 
publicly “chose” to put their identity on display. Even if sexual identity was 
generally non-public, if it appeared in a public record, it could provide a 
reasonable defense to defendants in some courts.204 Similarly, in defamation 
cases, truth was an absolute defense,205 thus creating an incentive for those 
who could pass as heterosexual to do just that. 
IV. THE COSTS OF PRIVACY 
Part IV argues that disability law’s privacy defaults and nudges have costs 
that have not yet been explored and debated.206 Antidiscrimination laws have 
deployed privacy as a way for individuals to hide experiences or parts of 
 
202 See, e.g., Selleck v. Globe Int’l Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (providing 
the facts of a case in which plaintiff, father of actor Tom Selleck, brought an action against a publisher 
of a tabloid magazine that allegedly quoted him about insults he allegedly made about his son’s 
romantic character including that he was allegedly “ill at ease with women” and “he [is] just not the 
person they [women] think he should be” (second alteration in original)). 
203 See, e.g., Borquez, 940 P.2d at 377 (“The disclosure of facts that are already public will not 
support a claim for invasion of privacy.” (citations omitted)). 
204 See, e.g., Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App. 2001) 
(affirming lower court decision denying plaintiff police officer’s invasion of privacy claim against 
news outlet because his sexual identity was the subject of a child custody proceeding and “once true 
information is disclosed in public court, there is no liability for giving publicity to that which is 
already public” (citations omitted)). 
205 Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: Re-
Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 119, 122-23 (2003). 
206 There are other costs to privileging privacy norms that I do not discuss in detail. For 
example, privacy masks the presence of disability in society and the contributions of people with 
disabilities historically. See, e.g., Sara White, Crippling the Archives: Negotiating Notions of Disability in 
Appraisal and Arrangement and Description, 75 AM. ARCHIVIST 109, 120-21 (2012) (discussing the 
barriers to documentation due to privacy laws and the effects on knowledge creation and historical 
work as a result); see also Yaron Covo, Gambling on Disability Rights, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 237, 243 
(2020) (arguing that the expressive value of “anti-tipping” rules in sports prohibiting the disclosure 
of athletes’ psychosocial impairments may reinforce stigma associated with mental and psychosocial 
impairments and obscure their prevalence among athletes). 
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identity deemed normatively “bad” or embarrassing.207 But it has also become 
a tool of perpetuating discrimination by masking its incidence. This Part 
complicates the current discussions of privacy in the context of disability by 
surfacing and unpacking the costs of our current approach. 
A. Privacy Obscures Prevalence and Diversity of Disability in Society 
By overvaluing privacy, we do not have an accurate picture of the breadth 
of disability in society and, as a result, society limits disability to visible 
markers. The aesthetics of disability in the aggregate depict the most severe 
(visible) manifestations of incapacity and, as such, delineate the “deserving 
disabled.”208 These markers have become probative and, in some cases, 
dispositive evidence of eligibility for public benefits programs like Social 
Security and access to legal rights (such as standing) under disability laws.209 
While not formally codified in any statute, the aesthetics of disability have 
become tools of statutory and regulatory interpretation used by judges, 
lawyers, and juries to decide cases.210 Notably, the aesthetic markers—
reinforced through limited media representations of disability as wheelchairs, 
canes, and dark glasses211—are normative guides for civilian vigilantes to 
 
207 Early privacy scholars skeptical of the veil of privacy such as Richard Posner argued that 
privacy is actually a fraud on the market for personal reputation. Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, 
and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (“The market approach suggests in turn that whatever 
rules governing fraud are deemed optimal in ordinary product markets ought in principle to apply 
equally in labor markets, credit markets, and ‘markets’ for purely personal relationships as well.”). 
Similarly, some contemporary privacy scholars actively challenge the very construction of privacy 
as flawed and ill-conceived, particularly considering an algorithmic-driven world. See, e.g., Kate 
Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy 
Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 106-09 (2014) (challenging the capacity of existing privacy frameworks 
to meaningfully capture and remedy the harms of big data mining). 
208 See, e.g., Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights 
Discourse, 53 LAW & SOC. REV. 1051, 1070 (2019) [hereinafter Dorfman, Fear] (“[T]he visibility of 
disability plays an important role in signaling the deservingness of rights claimants. This clearly 
visible deservingness has been found to have a much bigger effect on the assessment for potential 
disability con than the purist of self-interest and loss of personal opportunities in situations of 
scarcity.” (citing Doron Dorfman, [Un]Usual Suspects: Deservingness, Scarcity, and Disability Rights, 10 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 557 (2020))). 
209 The ADA as promulgated by Congress in 1990 defined disability as an “impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); Id. § 12132 (“[N]o 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). 
210 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 2, at 934-35 (discussing the impact of aesthetics of disability on 
juror decisionmaking). 
211 See Whitney Friedlander, How Hollywood Is Working to Improve Representation of People with 
Disabilities,” CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/06/entertainment/disability-representation-in-
hollywood/index.html [https://perma.cc/8FQ8-7BFM] (Sept. 6, 2019, 2:54 PM) (“There’s also the 
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police disability in schools, movie theaters, parking lots, airports and other 
public places of accommodation.212 On the one hand, people who do not 
conform and exercise their legal rights may subject themselves to harassment, 
public shaming, and, in some cases, physical violence. On the other hand, 
those with the visible markers who excel and surpass low expectations for 
people with disabilities are perceived as exceptional, “super-crips” who have 
overcome disability.213 
This, in turn, leads to a false impression that the number of people with 
disabilities is lower relative to other protected classes, such as women or racial 
minorities when, in fact, people with disabilities represent the most populous 
minority group.214 The number of people with disabilities in the United 
States continues to grow with longer life expectancies and, most recently, 
with the realization of the high percentage of people who will experience 
long-term health impairments as a result of COVID-19.215 Though existing 
data on people with less visible disabilities is scarce or criticized as 
methodologically suspect,216 it is possible to extrapolate this information from 
a recent data collection.217 
 
misunderstandings and stereotypes surrounding what constitutes a person with a disability and why 
their inclusion matters just as much as those of other minorities.”). 
212 See Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1070 (referring to the phenomenon of public fear of 
“the disability con” and importing this frame into disability law and policy); see also ELLEN 
SAMUELS, FANTASIES OF IDENTIFICATION: DISABILITY, GENDER, RACE (2014). The COVID-
19 pandemic has exacerbated fears of fraud associated with “anti-maskers” and vaccine “line 
jumpers.” See Ana Medaris Miller, ‘Anti-Maskers’ Say Medical Conditions Prevent Them from Wearing 
Masks, but Doctors Say That’s Not a Legitimate Excuse; BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2020, 7:36 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/anti-maskers-say-they-cant-wear-masks-because-medical-
conditions-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/9YXG-P9RL] (describing how mask wearing has become a 
political act and insincere claims of health hardships and privacy protections create public distrust); 
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Opinion, Yes, It Matters That People Are Jumping the Vaccine Line, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/28/opinion/covid-vaccine-line.html 
[https://perma.cc/769M-8KLU] (discussing public frustration with ineligible wealthy and politically 
connected individuals who have received vaccines in exchange for political favors, donations, or social status). 
213 See Sami Schalk, Reevaluating the Supercrip, 10 J. LITERARY & CULTURAL DISABILITY STUD. 71, 74 
(2016) (describing the term “supercrip” as a “pejorative term for overachieving people with disabilities” that 
emphasizes narratives of over “compensation for the perceived ‘lack’ created by disability”); see also Jasmine E. 
Harris, Opinion, ‘The Hill We Climb’ to Overcome Stereotypes About Disabilities, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 25, 2021, 4:00 
AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/The-Hill-We-Climb-to-overcome-
stereotypes-15894496.php [https://perma.cc/3QZ2-54VW] (describing the “disability inspiration 
porn” of Youth Poet Laureat Amanda Gorman overcoming her speech disability to perform at 
President Biden’s inauguration). 
214 The use of categorical identities also obscures the intersectionality of those identities, that 
is, people with disabilities are also women and people of color. 
215 Cf. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 10 (suggesting that the 
number of people with disabilities continues to grow because life expectancy has increased). 
216 Critics point to self-reporting as a central flaw of the disability data collection at the federal level. 
217 Thanks to Professor Dorfman for sharing data collected in a recent study. Dorfman, Fear, 
supra note 212, at 1063-64. Some of this data was used in a separate piece, however, I am taking raw 
 




data from his collection and extrapolating from it to estimate the percentage of people with physical 
(more visible) and less apparent disabilities. Survey Sampling International (SSI) administered the 
survey. With respect to its sampling, SSI recruits participants through various online communities, 
social networks, and website ads. SSI makes efforts to recruit hard-to-reach groups, such as ethnic 
minorities and seniors. These potential participants are then screened and invited into the panel. 
When deploying a particular survey, SSI randomly selects panel participants for survey invitations. 
While there was no weighing of particular participants, Professor Dorfman asked SSI to recruit in 
order to roughly match the census numbers of adults with disabilities (roughly 23-27% of the U.S. 
population overall). See id. 
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Table 1: Breakdown by Type of Disability (n=245)218 
 
TYPES OF DISABILITY FREQUENCY PERCENT CUMULATIVE 
Physical  152 62.04 62.04 
Mental  56 22.86 84.90 
Developmental  3 1.22 86.12 
Learning  2 0.82 86.94 
Chronic Illness 20 8.16 95.10 
Sensory  8 3.27 98.37 
Other 4 1.63 100.0 
TOTAL 245 100.0  
 
The data in Table 1 above allows for an estimate of the percentage of 
people with “more apparent” and “less apparent disabilities.” Of the people 
who responded to the survey as having a physical disability, half reported the 
use of an assistive device such as walkers, canes, prosthetic limbs, or 
wheelchairs (n=76).219 Assistive devices themselves are aesthetic markers of 
disability and would represent the more apparent end of the disability 
continuum. The balance of people reporting physical impairments would map 
closer to the nonapparent end of the continuum (n=76). The non-physical, 
“other” categories of disability in Table 1 above largely fall closer to the less 
apparent end of the continuum (n=93).220 Thus, a fair estimate of those with 
less apparent, fewer aesthetic markers is 169 people in the data sample, which 
is approximately 69% (169/245) or two-thirds of the data sample.221 
The absolute number of adults with disabilities in the United States is 
significant (approximately 61 million).222 The percentage of those with less 
apparent disabilities (those with few if any aesthetic markers) is 
approximately two-thirds, certainly more than a majority of all who identify 
as people with disabilities.223 Taken together, this is a much more nuanced 
 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
220 Behavioral manifestations of disabilities are not easily captured in this data set, nor are 
comorbid disabilities. Still, the data here roughly reflect broader estimates of non-apparent 
disabilities in society. The data also illustrate the flaws of current data collection and the need for 
more formal, consistent data collection, especially longitudinal, disaggregated data. 
221 Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1067 (“[I]t is fair to assume that the less visible the 
disability, the more likely it is suspected as fake. It is unsurprising that, of the narratives about 
situations in which respondents felt suspected of faking disability, 42% (43 out of 102) mentioned 
having ‘nonapparent’ disabilities or ‘not looking sick/disabled.’”). 
222 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC: 1 in 4 US Adults Live with 
a Disability (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2018/p0816-disability.html 
[https://perma.cc/W7ZE-AFUF]. 
223 See supra note 217. 
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and robust picture of people with disabilities that underscores the 
imperceptibility of disability in society. People with disabilities, like those of 
any identity group, may have different capabilities, but privacy norms that 
nudge people with less visible disabilities to cover or pass mask the sheer 
numbers of people with disabilities living their lives each day in public spaces. 
Thus, privacy norms prevent the development of a nuanced picture of 
people with disabilities along a continuum and, instead, maintain a social norm 
of disability as severe, obvious, and visible. This affects not only the relationships 
between people with and without disabilities but also horizontal relationships 
between those with and without aesthetic markers. If the norm was a continuum 
rather than a binary, people might feel less entitled to police what are understood 
as “special benefits” for a minority group. This includes actions by people with 
more apparent disabilities who question the legitimacy of claims to disability 
identity (and the resources that may come with such identification) by those 
without visible markers of disability.224 This distorted view, in turn, prevents 
broader sociopolitical organizing around disability identity. 
B. Ambiguity Aversion 
Privacy norms also may push discrimination underground. Specifically, 
privacy nudges in disability antidiscrimination and other laws may work 
counterintuitively to make people with disabilities more susceptible to bias 
in some settings. Consider the hiring process in the employment setting. 
Professors Joni Hersch and Jennifer Shinall’s work on “ambiguity aversion”—
that individuals prefer known risks over unknown risks225—offers insights 
about the cost of privacy in employment in the context of family status that 
extend analytically to disability status.226 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
and related regulations prohibit prospective employers from asking questions 
about marital status, and number and ages of children only of women and not 
men, or only of men and not women seeking employment, with the goal of 
mitigating sex discrimination.227 
Professors Hersch and Shinall’s empirical study asked whether 
nondisclosure or active concealment of personal information lowers female 
 
224 See JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL 
SAFETY NET 16 (2006) (discussing how people with more visible disabilities are perceived as more 
deserving of benefits). 
225 While the theory of ambiguity aversion is considered irrational in behavioral economics, it 
is still widely regarded as predictive. See generally Hersch & Shinall, supra note 90. Hersch and 
Shinall’s project is clear that the employer does not face ambiguity aversion when interviewing a 
male candidate because the caregiver work is assumed to be done by women. Id. at 56. 
226 Id. at 52. 
227 Id. 
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applicants’ hiring prospects.228 They concluded, counterintuitively, that 
workplace information restrictions “may actually serve to stifle, rather than 
improve, workplace equity” between men and women.229 They found that 
otherwise identical applicants with a substantial gap in their work history 
(namely, college-educated women in their forties) who do not explain 
personal family circumstances surrounding their job search are far less likely 
to be hired than those who do disclose, regardless of the content of the reason 
provided.230 Workplace information restrictions in this context result in 
employers refraining from asking such questions, and employment applicants 
similarly refraining from offering this information.231 The expressive value of 
law and perceptions that questions of disability, like questions of parental or 
family status are off-limits, creates a taboo space where parties on both sides 
feel constrained—the employer, not to ask questions, and the employee, not 
to give any information in those areas. Similar to the family status context, 
neither prospective hires nor existing employees are prohibited from 
discussing their disabilities or claiming a disability identity, however, the fact 
that employers may not ask questions pre-offer about disability nudges both 
employer and prospective employee to steer clear of disability discussions not 
only as taboo but also as illegal. 
Consider how ambiguity aversion operates in the employment context for 
two people with disabilities—Natalia, who has multiple sclerosis and uses a 
cane as an assistive device, and Jenny, who has a chronic illness, fibromyalgia, 
but no external aesthetic markers of disability. Both candidates have a gap in 
their resumes of roughly one year that goes unexplained in any of the 
application documents. Both women have comparable qualifications and 
credentials on paper. A data management company interviews both women 
for an open position. Neither has requested reasonable accommodations for 
the interview and their resumes have no information that could identify them 
as people with disabilities. 
Title I of the ADA, like Title VII after which it was modeled, provides 
preemployment protections for both job candidates. An employer “shall not 
conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to 
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or 
severity of such disability.”232 For Natalia, whose cane is an aesthetic marker, 
 
228 Id. at 49. 
229 Id. at 55. “To investigate whether concealing family information actually improves women’s 
employment prospects, we conducted an original experimental study fielded on more than 3000 
subjects.” Id. at 49. 
230 Id. at 55, 72. 
231 Id. at 54. 
232 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A). The employer is prohibited from asking questions about 
general health, past medical history, time off for health reasons, or the applicant’s worker’s 
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the challenge is not whether to disclose to the employer but when to do so 
(before, on the day of, or after an interview). She may need to disclose her 
disability before the interview if she needs to request reasonable 
accommodations—e.g., the company’s office in New York is on the tenth floor 
with no elevator. Natalia might request the interview be held somewhere else 
or virtually. If she waits to disclose, not only might she trigger the 
interviewer’s sensory or behavioral responses to disability aesthetics in real 
time, but the employer may also experience resentment, albeit unjustly, 
because the information was not shared previously, all of which could affect 
Natalia’s chances being hired.233 Because of restrictions on preemployment 
inquiries, the employer-interviewer will encounter the aesthetics of disability 
but will be unable to ask questions about it and, thus, experience ambiguity 
aversion with respect to future costs or work productivity.234 
Although the experience may differ somewhat for Jenny, the same 
ambiguity aversion exists for the employer. For Jenny, assuming no reasonable 
accommodation was requested for the interview, the choice is whether to 
disclose at all (at the interview, post-offer if hired, or on the job) or pass as 
nondisabled which would require her to self-accommodate. When her 
fibromyalgia is active, without accommodations, she may need to create 
excuses why she cannot be at work or must work remotely. Although Jenny 
does not manifest readily apparent aesthetic markers, her gap year raises 
questions about either her family status or disability, each heightening the 
ambiguity aversion experienced by the employer-interviewer. Employers also 
have concerns about applicants with invisible disabilities who they will hire 
and may feel trapped to accommodate because of antidiscrimination laws. 
The reality of low to de minimus accommodation costs is not widely 
understood even among human resources professionals or corporate 
compliance officers.235 This, combined with ambiguity aversion may explain 
 
compensation history. Employers are allowed to administer examinations after an offer of 
employment has been made but before the person begins her employment under certain conditions. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); e.g., id. § 12113(e) (listing conditions, such as when someone has an 
infectious disease). 
233 See, e.g., Melanie Whetzel, If We Had Known . . ., JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK (Nov. 
28, 2018), https://askjan.org/blogs/jan/2018/11/if-we-had-known.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z67R-
YKEX] (“Many employers expect job applicants to disclose their disabilities during the 
application/interview stage and feel deceived when they find out later on that an employee had a 
disability at the time of the hiring, but neglected to let the employer know. Some employers even 
go as far as to say if they had known about a disability, they wouldn’t have hired the employee.”). 
234 Covering may also be an option, i.e., not actively hiding identity but also not flaunting or 
performing a stereotypical version of it. See Yoshino, supra note 15, at 837. 
235 D.J. Hendricks, Linda C. Batiste & Anne Hirsh, Cost and Effectiveness of Accommodations in the 
Workplace: Preliminary Results of a Nationwide Study, DISABILITY STUD. Q., Fall 2005, https://dsq-
sds.org/article/view/623/800 [https://perma.cc/PDF2-KYBG] (reporting on Job Accommodation 
Network data and finding that the median accommodation cost to an employer is $250); see, e.g., H. 
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why employment rates for people with disabilities actually fell after Congress 
passed the ADA in 1990.236 
C. Privatizes the Costs of Disability 
The continued reliance on faulty social norms of disability in 
decisionmaking have led organizations devoted to increasing opportunities 
for people with disabilities to discourage disclosure, particularly in 
employment during the hiring process.237 For example, consider a job 
candidate, Zuri, a person with a less apparent disability. She discloses her 
disability on employment applications over the course of four years and never 
receives a call back. As a result, Zuri believes that her disclosure must have 
deterred prospective employers, particularly because she either easily meets 
or exceeds the listed job qualifications. After consulting with the Job 
Accommodation Network (JAN),238 a federally funded contractor, Zuri 
decides not to disclose her disability.239 
Zuri’s decision to omit reference to her disability in the hiring process, 
and, potentially, in the workplace at all, illustrates a third category of costs 
of overvaluing privacy norms: privatizing the costs of disability. Rather 
than exercise one’s rights in the workplace, for example, people with 
disabilities are opting out of exercising their rights or underaccommodating 
to downplay disability.240 Without disclosure, an employer has no legal 
obligation to accommodate those with nonobvious disabilities.241 
 
Stephen Kaye, Lita H. Jans & Erica C. Jones, Why Don’t Employers Hire and Retain Workers with Disabilities?, 
21 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 526, 533-34 (2011) (citing several studies finding “that the typical individual 
accommodation is inexpensive and more than pays for itself in increased productivity”). 
236 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 276 (2000) 
(“[E]mployment levels fell significantly for disabled workers aged 21-39 relative to nondisabled 
workers in this same age cohort.” (citing Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, Consequences of 
Employment Protection? The Case the Americans with Disabilities Act 12-13 (Working Paper 1999))). 
237 See Whetzel, supra note 233 (“If no accommodation is needed for the application or the 
interview process, you might seriously consider postponing the disclosure conversation until after 
you get a job offer.”). 
238 JAN is funded by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Office of Disability Employment 
Policy. About JAN, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://askjan.org/about-us/index.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/4KNQ-7V9U]. 
239 This hypothetical is based on an example found in Whetzel, supra note 233. 
240 David C. Baldridge & John F. Veiga, Toward a Greater Understanding of the Willingness to 
Request an Accommodation: Can Requesters’ Beliefs Disable the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 26 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 85, 85 (2001) (“[U]nderaccommodation continues to be a major barrier to equal 
employment opportunities for people with disabilities.” (citing DAVID BRADDOCK & LYNN 
BACHELDER, THE GLASS CEILING AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (1994))). 
241 See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., 93 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding for the 
employer because the plaintiff failed to disclose to the employer “any limitations resulting from his 
disability, and . . . any need for a reasonable accommodation”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1029 (1996). 
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Thus, the ADA creates what disability scholars have dubbed “the 
Goldilocks dilemma” or the “double bind,” where the person with a disability 
has to show both the existence of an impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities and, at the same time, that she is qualified to 
perform the essential functions of a job.242 This places people with disabilities 
in an awkward position where “successfully performing as a worker, seem[s] 
to cast doubt on one’s disability, and vice versa,” requiring that they choose 
among two opposite normative performances.243 As a result, not only are the 
costs placed on the individual to assimilate, but privacy does nothing to 
populate the continuum of disability and challenge the legitimate/illegitimate 
binary. This creates an environment where “workers often struggle to 
conform to some imagined ideal of disability by downplaying or hiding their 
disability; or, by giving the impression that they are overcoming their 
disability through hard work and determination.”244 It also establishes an 
expectation that this is possible, desired, or the gold standard. Thus, “many 
workers view their ADA rights through the perspective of their coworkers; 
imagining how they are judged, accepted, or rejected as workers. For this 
reason, workers perform and adopt an attitude that downplays the effects of 
their disability and avoids relying too heavily on the ADA.”245 
One study, based on qualitative interviews with workers with disabilities, 
captures the ways in which suspicions and public policing (and even the 
thought of exposure to it) alters workers’ behavior. For one employee who 
fell and injured her ankle, her supervisor’s suspicion and disbelief about her 
disability pushed her to contemplate finding a new job rather than exercise 
her rights to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.246 The study 
illustrates the extent to which some employees with disabilities will go to 
“hide their disability, its impact on their bodies, or any visual reference to 
it.”247 Individuals with disabilities exist in siloes in the workplace with strong 
privacy norms. Those with the aesthetics of disability focus on either 
downplaying the disability or exaggerating the visible impairment to secure 
 
242 Areheart, supra note 74, at 181, 185-87. The ADA as promulgated by Congress in 1990 defined 
disability as an “impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Paul R. Durlak, Making Rights in the Workplace: Workers’ 
Perceptions of the Americans with Disabilities Act 19 (May 14, 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Buffalo, State University of New York) (on file with author) (“This dilemma frames the 
performance and outward appearance of disability as a seemingly contradictory thing: disabled, yet 
also able to work. As a result, many scholars accused the courts of maintaining an almost impossible 
standing for people with a disability seeking protection from the law.” (citations omitted)). 
243 Durlak, supra note 242, at 19. 
244 Id. at 21. 
245 Id. at 30; see also Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1067-68 (discussing experiences with and 
fear of disability suspicion among people with invisible and visible disabilities). 
246 Durlak, supra note 242, at 31-32. 
247 Id. at 32. 
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a place among the “deserving disabled” and exercise rights to 
accommodations.248 At the other end of the continuum, people without the 
aesthetic markers seek to pass as nondisabled so as to not make waves even if 
it means forgoing legal rights. This approach may also place the disabled 
employee in a more precarious situation where nondisclosure means the 
person cannot access a needed accommodation to perform the essential 
functions of the position and, thus, become more susceptible to a negative 
employment action.249 
In either case, privacy norms transfer the costs of accommodations to 
employees. This not only exacerbates the emotional and physical labor 
associated with performing disability, but also financially burdens employees 
rather than the employer or institution. People with disabilities experience a 
“disability tax,” the extra costs of daily living, such as additional medical 
expenses, personal assistance, retrofitting spaces for accessibility, food, 
clothing, or other personal care items. One study suggests that living with a 
disability may cost an additional estimated $1000 to $7000 per year, which, 
over time, becomes a considerable financial burden on households.250 
This is particularly egregious when taking an employers’ costs into 
consideration. Research suggests that provision of reasonable accommodations 
costs most employers nothing and, when there is a cost, the typical 
expenditure to the employer is de minimis.251 Interestingly, the employers 
surveyed in one study reported that they gain several advantages that greatly 
outweigh the costs, including direct benefits such as retention of employees, 
avoiding the costs of onboarding new employees, increased productivity, 
increased attendance, and greater diversity.252 Indirect benefits noted by 
employers include improved interactions between co-workers and increased 
 
248 Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1070 (discussing the role of disability visibility in 
“signaling the deservingness” of people with disabilities). 
249 The design of disability antidiscrimination law here encourages disabled employees to 
“lead[]” with their value first and then, only if needed, disclose a disability. Rachel Casper, 
Transitioning Reasonable Accommodations from Law School to the Workplace, LAWS. CONCERNED FOR 
LAWS. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.lclma.org/2020/01/30/transitioning-reasonable-accommodations-
from-law-school-to-the-workplace-bba-event-on-february-3 [https://perma.cc/U34V-85YG]. 
250 Sophie Mitra, Daniel Mont, Hoolda Kim, Michael Palmer & Nora Groce, The Hidden Extra Costs 
of Living with A Disability, CONVERSATION (July 25, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-hidden-
extra-costs-of-living-with-a-disability-78001 [https://perma.cc/S7Q8-WRH3]. 
251 JOB ACCOMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH 
IMPACT 2 (2020), https://askjan.org/publications/Topic-
Downloads.cfm?pubid=962628&action=download&pubtype=pdf [https://perma.cc/Y588-MWQ2]. 
252 Id. at 2,4. 
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company morale.253 Moreover, employers can use certain state and federal tax 
benefits to offset the costs of providing reasonable accommodations.254 
Finally, when individual employees absorb the costs of accommodation, this 
relieves pressure for public entities to change structures, practices, and policies 
that presume “typical” bodies and minds. Consider corporate diversity, equity, 
and inclusion (DEI) efforts: while ninety percent of companies claim to invest 
in and value diversity, only four percent include disability as part of their DEI 
efforts.255 Nevertheless, the case for disability as diversity exists not only as a 
potential customer base but also with respect to corporate social responsibility 
and best practices for employee hiring and retention.256 Companies such as 
Virgin Media have set hiring goals much like those under Section 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act to increase the number of employees with disabilities at their 
organizations, in part, by paying attention to the ways that disability biases 
infect hiring and may weed out qualified applicants.257 
To the extent that corporations advance disability as a part of DEI, and 
even set hiring goals, DEI data is often kept confidential even in the aggregate 
(with no personally identifying information). As a result, companies are not 
held accountable for their inclusion initiatives. Even more troubling, under 
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act where federal contractors have a duty to 
design and implement affirmative action and produce data to show 
compliance, both the contactors and government agencies have claimed, for 
example, that this information is proprietary to the contracting organization 
and thus not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests.258 
V. THE VALUE OF PUBLICITY 
Part V takes up the natural question of how to address the negative privacy 
costs discussed in Part IV. First, I introduce the value of publicity, in part, by 
offering a more nuanced framing of privacy to include the collective interests 
in disability identity. Second, I explain how and why publicity plays a starring 
role in contemporary social movements such as #MeToo and Dreamers. 
 
253 Id. at 4. 
254 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 44(c) (detailing tax benefits for small businesses for architectural changes, 
equipment, or services); id. § 190 (detailing tax benefits for businesses of any size that make 
architectural and transportation modifications). 
255 Caroline Casey, Do Your D&I Efforts Include People with Disabilities?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/do-your-di-efforts-include-people-with-disabilities 
[https://perma.cc/N6HM-8QG9]. 
256 Id. 
257 See id. 
258 See supra note 151. This is a disturbing trend happening also in other spaces. See, e.g., 
Bowman, supra note 151, at 1690 (discussing the use of trade secret arguments to control information 
in litigation and noncompete agreement contexts). 
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Finally, I offer three concrete steps we can take to recalibrate: disability data, 
law reform, and strategic nudges to incentivize publicity of disability identity. 
A. Theoretical Re-Framing of the Interests/Stakes 
Privacy conceptions that focus solely on the individual are insufficient to 
capture the varied interests at play in disability antidiscrimination law. 
Outside of disability law, several privacy law scholars have moved away from 
a narrow framing of privacy as purely an individual right to self-
determination by recognizing public interests at stake in the production and 
circulation of information. These discussions among scholars can help us 
better understand why some degree of privacy must exist in the context of 
disability identity and status but, perhaps most relevant to the disability 
space, why privacy is not absolute nor simply a matter of individual choice. 
For example, in addition to baseline constitutional arguments in favor of 
privacy under the First and Fourth Amendments,259 Pricilla Regan argues 
that while privacy is valuable for the individual, it also is critical for society. 
All, or at least the vast majority of, individuals value some degree of privacy 
(of information, home, or body), and this privacy is essential for both 
individual and social existence.260 
First, Professor Regan contends that privacy is effectively a “collective or 
public good, as used in economics” because both technology and market 
forces make it more difficult for any one person to have privacy without all 
persons having a similar minimum level of privacy.261 Because technology and 
automation require some disclosure to allow the individual to participate in 
society—receive health care, apply for employment, maintain a bank account, 
attain a mortgage, etc.—it is not realistic to think that the individual could 
exit the market completely. If an individual did go “off the grid,” accessing 
goods and services for the individual would be more difficult and the 
imbalance would make the market more inefficient.262 Second, some level of 
privacy is fundamental to the development of commonality—namely, our 
democratic political system and process.263 People can express divergent 
political opinions and construct individual identities vis-à-vis the body 
politic; as a result, privacy itself is intrinsically linked to publicity and 
 
259 Specifically, the First Amendment right entails freedom of speech and the Fourth Amendment 
right protects against unwanted government intrusion. 
260 See supra Section I.A. 
261 Priscilla Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF PRIVACY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 57, 57-61 (citation omitted). 
262 Id. at 59. 
263 Id.; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1610-11 (1999) (arguing that privacy protections are important to protect individuals seeking to 
explore and understand their identities and discuss those identities with others online). 
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defining what is public because it ensures that people are not “over-
differentiated,” an important point in the context of disability.264 
We have a conception of privacy that is not absolute. Most notable 
exceptions to personal control and strong privacy as the basis for autonomy 
are rooted in public safety or health where an individual’s rights to the 
information or the decision may be trumped if the public value is strong 
enough, as we have experienced during COVID-19. Everything from 
HIV/AIDS and partner notification, respecting personal privacy may run 
counter to the well-being of others (biological relatives for certain types of 
genetic risk or sexual partners in the case of STIs). While there are strict edicts 
about the need to protect privacy in the medical sphere, well-recognized 
exceptions exist and continue to emerge when nondisclosure is likely to result 
in harm to others. This is baked into professional responsibility duties and 
ethics such as the exception to the requirement that lawyers keep their clients’ 
secrets, including in an ongoing investigation where the crime has not been 
solved.265 The rules say that the lawyer “may” disclose if the public interest is 
strong enough, and the threat must be “imminent[].”266 
Thus, the question is not limited to privacy or publicity, disclosure or 
nondisclosure. Rather, discussions about privacy in the context of disability 
should be malleable and are highly contextual. This Article offers principles 
or criteria that should be used in designing disability antidiscrimination 
interventions to allow for a robust accounting of the stakes of disclosure and 
the relevant stakeholders. The next subsection defines “publicity” and offers 
places where strategic nudges in disability law and policy can introduce 
publicity values into the privacy debates. Rather than the opposite of privacy, 
publicity is intrinsically connected to it.267 
B. Publicity Values in Social Movements 
“Publicity” here means a strategic communications approach to 
systematically change problematic social norms. Publicity requires that public 
and private institutions create spaces for individuals with less apparent 
disabilities to claim disability as a sociopolitical identity while paying 
attention to individual interests in privacy. Unlike existing privacy norms in 
 
264 Regan, supra note 261, at 59 (quoting PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: 
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 226-27 (1995)). For example, if a social 
media platform extracts data to deliver targeted political messages, the democratic process, writ 
large, would be harmed, hence the broader public interests at stake. 
265 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) cmt. ¶¶ 7-8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
266 Id. ¶ 6. 
267 See, e.g., JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED 
FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 30 (2018) (“The creation of a right of publicity and its divergence from the 
right of privacy were not driven by essential differences.”). 
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disability law that place the onus on the individual to control and protect her 
interests in disability status and identity, the introduction of publicity 
recognizes the remedial role institutional actors must play. Just as privacy 
scholars tout the collective value of privacy for democratic participation, 
publicity values offer key organizing principles for the development of 
disability as a sociopolitical identity.268 Publicity, therefore, refers to more 
than individuals with less apparent disabilities “coming out” as disabled.269 
Individual decisions to conceal disability identity or status, where 
possible, respond to structural-level social stigma; however, concealment does 
nothing to change the problematic structures themselves.270 Similarly, while 
coming out as a person with a disability has the potential for individual and, 
in the aggregate, group movement-building, this alone is insufficient to solve 
the structural problem of institutionalized ableism and neurotypicality that is 
so pervasive in society. 
Three critical features link contemporary movements such as the 
Dreamers (undocumented Americans) and #MeToo (survivors of sexual 
violence and harassment) with the early LGB movement in the 1970s and 
1980s and the evolving disability rights movement.271 First, and most 
prominently, publicity is at the core of the movement. In fact, these 
movements appropriate the master schema of the “closet” and “coming out” 
not because it is a perfect metaphor, rather, because it is a well-known one that 
can generate broader support.272 Although, retrospectively, some sexuality 
scholars have questioned the utility of the “closet” metaphor for the gay rights 
 
268 Jodi Dean, Publicity’s Secret, 29 POL. THEORY 624, 624-25 (2001). 
269 The closet as a metaphor and foil to coming out have been critiqued by scholars such as 
Judith Butler and Eve Sedgwick for its reliance on binary oversimplification. Danielle Bobker, 
Coming Out: Closet Rhetoric and Media Publics, 5 HIST. PRESENT 31, 34 (2015). Michael Warner’s 
work, for example, critiques the mantra “the personal is political”—that is, that issues of personal 
identity provide an ideal focus for political action—as dangerously reinforcing the individual as the 
subject and one that is solely responsible for their invisibility. MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND 
COUNTERPUBLICS 52 (2002). 
270 See Michael H. Pasek, Gabrielle Filip-Crawford, & Jonathan Cook, Identity Concealment and 
Social Change: Balancing Advocacy Goals Against Individual Needs, 73 J. SOC. ISSUES 397, 398 (2017). 
271 The first generation included the grassroots organizers and protestors such as Judith 
Heumann, Ed Roberts, and Justin Dart. See generally FRED PELKA, WHAT WE HAVE DONE: AN 
ORAL HISTORY OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 183-226 (2012); JUDITH HEUMANN & 
KRISTEN JOINER, BEING HEUMANN: AN UNREPENTANT MEMOIR OF A DISABILITY RIGHTS 
ADVOCATE (2020). There are a number of disability rights priorities today that were not a part of 
the early movement, for example, understanding how race and class intersect with movement leaders 
and priorities. See, e.g., Letter from Disability Rts. Laws. & Activists to the Steering Comm., 
tenBroek Disability L. Symp., Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind (Apr. 5, 2019) (on file with author) 
(highlighting the lack of diversity among the movement’s leaders and the need to contend with race 
and transphobia within the disability legal community). 
272 This is the subject of a working book manuscript on the role of publicity in social 
movements and will not be built out in this piece. 
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movement and thus, its applicability to other movements,273 other social 
movement scholars note the transposability of the metaphor as its legacy: 
Coming out was, for the first time, set up in explicit relation to the metaphor 
of the closet. A hostile, homophobic mainstream culture was blamed for the 
creation of the closet but individuals, including gay individuals, were blamed 
for its maintenance. Thus, the mantra “Come Out, Come Out, Wherever 
You Are” of the 1980s and 1990s can be understood as just as much of a demand 
for gays and lesbians to publicly declare their sexuality as an assurance of safety and 
community. This new formulation of coming out asserts “the public relevance 
of what others deem private.”274 
Second, the movements organized around, at least in part, the ways in 
which laws and regulations contributed to their marginalization by forcing 
them to “hide in the shadows.” For example, in the gay rights context, 
Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued that laws forced sociopolitical invisibility, 
such as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”.275 Social action and calls from Harvey Milk 
to come out of the closet forged a movement that led to legal victories and 
legislative victories such as the death of anti-sodomy laws targeting the gay 
community.276 Survivors of sexual violence organized the #MeToo movement 
 
273 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, 
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 958 (1989) (arguing that LGB individuals “would rather 
switch than fight” if they are able to blend in with their heteronormative counterparts, limiting the 
LGB movement). 
274 Abigail C. Saguy & Anna Ward, Coming Out as Fat: Rethinking Stigma, 74 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 
53, 59 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting JOSHUA GAMSON, FREAKS TALK BACK: 
TABLOID TALK SHOWS AND SEXUAL NONCONFORMITY 200 (1998)). 
275 Yoshino, supra note 15, at 778; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to 
John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Reps., Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on 
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-
marriage-act [https://perma.cc/7BVM-3YAB] (“[A] growing scientific consensus accepts that sexual 
orientation is a characteristic that is immutable; it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual orientation 
to be hidden from view to avoid discrimination.” (citations omitted)). 
276 In one of Milk’s more famous speeches about the ideal of equality, he professed: 
Gay people, we will not win our rights by staying quietly in our closets. . . . We are 
coming out to fight the lies, the myths, the distortions. We are coming out to tell the 
truths about gays, for I am tired of the conspiracy of silence, so I’m going to talk about 
it. And I want you to talk about it. You must come out. 
The Official HARVEY MILK Biography, MILKFOUNDATION.ORG, 
https://milkfoundation.org/about/harvey-milk-biography [https://perma.cc/W7D4-WSZT]. Dan White, also 
a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, assassinated Harvey Milk and San Francisco Mayor 
George Moscone on November 27, 1978. White vehemently opposed a city antidiscrimination ordinance 
introduced to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination in employment, public services, and places of 
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in response to the inability of law to provide protection or justice for 
survivors. This included a frontal attack on the use of nondisclosure 
agreements in private settlements with survivors that obscured real structural 
issues around power and sexual violence.277 Moreover, advocates are calling 
for Congress to introduce bills that restrict the use of mandatory arbitration 
agreements in harassment disputes and require employers to disclose 
harassment claims.278 
Similarly, the Dreamers organized around moving “out of the shadows” 
where punitive immigration law and policies forced undocumented 
immigrants to hide or face deportation.279 Professor Rose Cuison Villazor, for 
example, explains that “[t]o lessen the chances of deportation [undocumented 
immigrants] live in society in largely unnoticed ways and avoid calling 
attention to their very existence, despite the burdens of living concealed 
lives.”280 In addition to the threat of or actual deportation, undocumented 
immigrants face legal obstacles in a variety of other circumstances pertaining 
to detention, re-entry, and employment. For example, undocumented 
immigrants can be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the 
individual is to be removed from the United States.281 If an undocumented 
immigrant is removed from the United States, that individual will likely face 
barriers to re-entry.282 Both despite and because of these barriers for 
undocumented immigrants, many undocumented immigrants have revealed 
their undocumented status as they “seek to acquire recognition of their 
existence from society” and change the “shadow” narrative.283 Professor 
 
[https://perma.cc/7K6Y-TQXF]. In fact, Dan White “feared” that his constituents would “move out of the city 
or ‘react punitively,’” in statements later used as evidence of his animus toward gay men, including Harvey 
Milk. Tim Fitzsimons, Forty Years After His Death, Harvey Milk’s Legacy Still Lives On, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 
2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/forty-years-after-his-death-harvey-milk-s-legacy-
still-n940356 [https://perma.cc/TE2U-BTRM] (quoting Ledbetter, supra). 
277 Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual 
Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 858, 866-70 (2019). 
278 See Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
229, 235 (2018) (describing the current state and federal laws legislators are considering that restrict 
the use of mandatory arbitration agreements). 
279 See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (drawing 
from the “coming out” metaphor to describe how undocumented individuals go through a version 
of this when they reveal their immigration status). 
280 Id. at 29. 
281 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested 
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”). 
282 See id. § 1182(a)(9) (stating provisions for excluding undocumented individuals who were 
previously removed from the United States). 
283 Cuison Villazor, supra note 279, at 29, 52. 
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Cuison Villazor suggests that the change in social narrative may prompt a 
change in the law,284 a common thread connecting these social movements. 
In this respect, the disability rights movement parts ways with its 
contemporaries. Neither the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 nor the Americans 
with Disabilities Act came about as a result of a highly publicized and 
contested social movement. This is not to say that disability rights advocates 
did not contribute to the promulgation of these disability antidiscrimination 
laws; their legacies are clear. Rather, when we think about the major social 
movements of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries such as civil rights 
movements for racial and gender equality, or the gay rights movement, 
publicity was a major part of the strategy to gain access to rights. There were 
relatively fewer nationally televised protests (perhaps other than the 
occupation of the HEW office in San Francisco to force HEW Secretary 
Califano to issue regulations for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973),285 there was 
no publicly visible mass political or social contestation that produced the 
ADA similar to that which produced the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In fact, 
legislative advocates involved with the ADA’s promulgation explicitly relied 
on public inattention to the ADA which allowed it to pass without the 
common partisan negotiations and in-fighting. The next subsection offers 
initial prescriptions—both legal and policy reforms—that emphasize the role 
of institutions and not just individuals in advancing publicity values to shift 
social norms of disability. 
C. The Prescriptive Path Ahead 
The primary contribution of this Article is to challenge an assumption in 
disability law that privacy best serves antidiscrimination efforts. The 
operative prescription or set of prescriptions must ask how we make disability 
more visible; not how do we hide it better. We want to find a way to best 
incentivize publicity and visibility while mitigating or eliminating its costs. 
The recalibration of privacy and publicity values in disability law is a 
massive, long-term project. However, I offer a few initial prescriptions in 
 
284 See id. at 61 (explaining how the Dreamers’ coming out movement has pushed for more 
favorable immigration policies, including President Barack Obama instituting the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program). 
285 Other publicized protests include the 1990 Capitol Crawl and the “Deaf President Now” protest 
by deaf students at Gallaudet University. Becky Little, When the ‘Capitol Crawl’ Dramatized the Need for 
Americans with Disabilities Act, HISTORY (July 24, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/americans-with-
disabilities-act-1990-capitol-crawl [https://perma.cc/L9W4-XM4C] (“Though reporters and photographers 
covered the Capitol Crawl . . . it didn’t receive a huge amount of media attention at the time.”). See generally 
JOHN B. CHRISTIANSEN & SHARON N. BARNARTT, DEAF PRESIDENT NOW!: THE 1988 REVOLUTION 
AT GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY (1995). 
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service of reframing the current conversations. On the front end, data 
collection and institutional subsidies can help advance visibility. 
1. Disability Data 
We need to understand the scope and diversity of disability in society to 
populate a disability continuum advanced in this Article. Similarly, we need to 
track investment in disability rights laws, policies, and interventions, and, more 
broadly, to understand the impact of laws and policies on people with 
disabilities. Thus, we need to create a structure for disclosure and data gathering 
that does not only go to diversity departments at universities or human resources 
departments in the private sector, but also has greater public value. 
This Article identified the absence of reliable data on disability in public 
circulation and attributed this to the construction of disability identity as 
private. Federal and state governments do collect information on disability,286 
however, these data collections are not designed to track and meaningfully 
measure disability identity. The three main federal disability surveys ask 
about the same six disability categories of impairment: hearing, vision, 
cognitive, ambulatory, self-care, and independent living.287 
The U.S. Census tracks demographic information on race and ethnicity, 
but it does not include disability in its main data reporting.288 Instead, the 
American Community Survey (ACS), a project of the U.S. Census, does 
gather disability data based on functional impairments tied to daily living. The 
ACS replaced the Census “long-form” as way of streamlining the formal data 
collection process.289 The ACS, however, does not survey the same breadth of 
the population included in the Census; instead, the Census is a decennial 
count focused on “a basic headcount and minimal demographic data.”290 
To align disability with other identity classifications listed, we could 
include three questions about disability on the short-form census. First, “Do 
 
286 See, e.g., How Disability Data Are Collected from the American Community Survey, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/health/disability/guidance/data-collection-
acs.html [https://perma.cc/6H2P-FZF5] (Feb. 23, 2021). 
287 Id. 
288 While disability questions on the Census originated in 1830, the short-form Census no longer 
includes questions about disability. See American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we-ask-each-question/disability [https://perma.cc/CX8Z-
SVPT]; NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, WHY ARE THERE NO DISABILITY-RELATED 
QUESTIONS ON THE 2020 CENSUS? (2020), https://www.ndrn.org/resource/why-are-there-no-
disability-related-questions-on-the-2020-census [https://perma.cc/2VPW-3NPP]; cf. Brief of Historians 
and Social Scientists Margo Anderson, Andrew Beveridge, Rachel Buff, Morgan Kousser, Mae Ngai, 
and Steven Ruggles as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 
S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (No. 18-966). 
289 How Disability Data Are Collected, supra note 286. 
290 Id. 
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you identify as a person with a disability?” Second, “Do you believe your 
disability is visible to others?” Third, “I believe my disability is visible to 
others because. . .” Followed by answer choices: “(a) I use an assistive device 
such as a wheelchair, prosthetic, cane, communication board, (b) my speech 
or behavior is atypical (e.g., physical tics, hyperactivity, speech impairments), 
or (c) I have been told my disability is visible, or (d) None of the above.” We 
would still benefit from the data collected by the ACS, however, Census data 
on disability identity with the seal of the federal government has both 
expressive and practical value. Data collected on disability should be 
disaggregated along other demographic lines such as gender or age, city/state, 
education level, employment status, family status, income, publicly funded 
supports received (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare) as examples of desired 
disaggregation. Importantly, definitions of disability listed should address the 
ways in which people struggle with self-identification as well as the purpose 
of the data collection and why this information is important to report. This 
priming may increase the number of people who claim disability identity and 
allows us a centralized source for capturing intersectional identities. 
What effect might such changes have? Interestingly, when the Census first 
expanded the available categories for race, civil rights organizations such as 
the NAACP worried about the dilution of the benefits extended to particular 
minority groups. Specifically, the NAACP claimed that “the creation of a 
multiracial classification might disaggregate the apparent numbers of 
members of discrete minority groups, diluting benefits to which they are 
entitled as a protected class under civil rights laws.”291 To what extent might 
people with more apparent disabilities argue the same point if people can 
simply self-identify on the Census form as disabled? 
Developing the institutional capacity and scaffolding for meaningful data 
collection could include several pilot projects in public institutions that 
already have systems in place to collect demographic data. One larger data 
collection option is to add this question to the Social Security 
Administration’s data collection, which could help us better understand how 
people who receive social security disability insurance (SSDI) benefits 
perceive their connection to disability identity.292 
 
291 Kenneth Prewitt, Racial Classification in America: Where Do We Go from Here?, 134 DAEDALUS 
5, 10 (2005) (quoting Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the Comm on Gov’t Reform & Oversight, 
105th Cong. 578-79 (1997) (statement of Harold McDougall, Dir., Washington Burau, NAACP)). 
292 Doron Dorfman conducted a qualitative study to better understand the disconnect between 
perceptions of disability by social security benefits recipients and those narratives created by social 
security laws. See Doron Dorfman, Disability Identity in Conflict: Performativity in the U.S. Social 
Security Benefits System, 38 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 47 (2015). The inclusion of a disability question 
in existing data collection to a broader sample of benefits recipients under certain conditions could 
be an example of a relatively lower cost data collection that builds on existing institutional structures. 
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2. Choice Architecture and Publicity Nudges 
The balance between privacy and publicity values as structural 
antidiscrimination devices should vary based on several factors.293 First, and 
most important in designing laws and policies with the right balance of 
privacy and publicity, we need to understand which settings have the greatest 
potential to shift social norms. Here, the social science literature emphasizes 
two settings where a person with a less visible marginalized identity can 
“come out” and impact the attitudes that underwrite discrimination: 
employment and higher education.294 People choose not to disclose because 
of the danger (physical, workplace or educational achievement, economic, 
health) of sharing this information. Assume, for example, that research 
indicates that employment is the best environment for shifting social norms 
of disability. Possible institutional responses include legislative efforts to 
strengthen the antidiscrimination safety net so people who come out know 
that if they experience bias (both explicit and implicit) as a result of coming 
out, they receive litigation benefits such as favorable presumptions or 
reductions in applicable burdens of production or persuasion.295 
At the employer level, several potential institutional responses exist. 
Employers need to change workplace climates, which requires a long-term 
commitment. This could include required publication of disability 
antidiscrimination complaints filed with the EEOC against the employer, 
final opinions, and, if settled, disclosure of the policy changes to be 
implemented. The employer can commit to public settlements and reject the 
use of nondisclosure provisions as part of the settlement negotiation. While 
the person with a disability would have control over their name, there is no 
reason why the employer cannot publish statistics in the aggregate, 
particularly for larger organizations. The places of publication could be 
employee breakrooms or monthly newsletters and meetings where employees 
would hear about litigation. These statistics would also be made available on 
the company’s website to ensure public accountability. Another benefit would 
be to regularly identify opportunities for structural reforms rather than 
individual accommodations such as when the data shows, for example, that 
30% of employees have carpal tunnel. Instead of individually assessing each 
 
293 See RICHARDS, supra note 32 (manuscript intro. at 7-8) (advancing the idea that the design 
of privacy rules can help mitigate inequities in the balance of power between those who possess 
disproportionate access to both the means of data control as well as the data itself and those whose 
data is the oil that runs the data-dependent machinery). 
294 See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) (listing the 
conditions shown to contribute to greater norm shifts which include equal status, common goals, 
intergroup cooperation, and support of authorities, law, or customs). 
295 The presumptions should be more than Title VII disparate impact presumptions. See 
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. 
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employee (which can be costly), employers can invest in ergonomic assistive 
technology that will benefit those with and without carpal tunnel. While one 
concern is that publicity may increase fear and reluctance to come out, over 
time, the greater information in circulation can reduce overall costs of 
disclosure to the individual.296 
Second, we need to better understand if the impact and effectiveness of 
disclosure on social norms varies depending on other factors such as who is 
disclosing (demographics on age, race, gender, socioeconomic status).297 For 
example, if we knew that greater normative shifts occurred when well-
established, middle-aged, white, men came out as disabled, we might design 
a top-down approach to disclosure, that creates incentives for people who are 
well established in their careers and who might even have a public presence 
to come out. One way might be through financial incentives, direct grants to 
do this, positions of authority, or being the public face of the organization. In 
this way, if the data supported it, we could develop the disability “brand” by 
incentivizing people like Justice Sotomayor (who came out as a person with 
diabetes), or David Boies (a nationally renowned litigator) and actor Henry 
Winkler, both who came out as people with learning disabilities. Consider 
how singer-songwriter-actor Lady Gaga’s coming out as a person with 
fibromyalgia is changing public discourse on its legitimacy as a chronic 
illness.298 While placing the risks associated with disclosure on the few with 
the least to lose, a danger here would be exceptionalism, treating famous 
people with disabilities as exceptions and not the norm. 
Third, we have a first actor problem here. The costs of disclosure are 
highest, and often are, for first actors in any setting as they are when 
attempting to nudge disclosure and develop publicity norms. Institutional 
actors—employers, educators—could consider what Professor Ian Ayres and 
Cait Unkovic call “information escrows,” or “mechanism[s] of conditional, 
intermediated communication[s].”299 Ayres and Unkovic argue that the first 
actor problem in sexual assault and whistleblower cases can be addressed 
through information banking, or “allegation escrows” that “allow people to 
 
296 Other policy interventions include investing in the creation of an affinity group and 
commitment to making disability a part of the institution’s overall diversity efforts. 
297 I do not list all of the potentially relevant variables here; however, one might consider the 
effect on norm shifts of types of invisible disabilities disclosed—for example, mental health 
disabilities might have less of an impact relative to learning disabilities. 
298 She made it more prevalent and a part of human difference rather than incapacity. See 
Laura Hensley, Lady Gaga on Her Fight with Fibromyalgia: ‘Chronic Pain Is No Joke,’ GLOB. NEWS 
(Sept. 11, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://globalnews.ca/news/4438236/what-is-fibromyalgia-lady-gaga 
[https://perma.cc/GB7H-XJWB] (discussing Lady Gaga’s ongoing struggle with fibromyalgia, a 
brief history of the chronic illness, and where it stands today as a verified physical illness). 
299 Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145, 150 (2012) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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place actionable claims into escrow that will only be filed against a potential 
defendant by the escrow agent if a prespecified number of allegations are 
ledged against the same defendant.”300 The primary function of this model, 
in sexual assault cases, is to respond to the possibility that there will be a first-
mover disadvantage in claiming sexual assault or harassment.301 Victims are 
often more reluctant to bring an initial claim because they face a higher risk 
of retaliation from accused harassers, their credibility is more prone to attack, 
and some potential claimants may be unsure about whether they incorrectly 
labeled their experiences as sexual assaults.302 Information escrow allows 
victims “to transmit claims information to a trusted intermediary, a 
centralized escrow agent, who forwards the information to proper authorities 
if (and only if) certain prespecified conditions are met.”303 
Building on this idea to balance interests in privacy and publicity, 
institutional actors could develop what I call “disability identity escrow,” with 
an independent intermediary between the employer and the employee who 
owes fiduciary duties to employees with disabilities. The employer, to 
encourage disclosure, could allocate funds for the operation of a disability 
affinity group to engage in such activities as networking, socializing with 
colleagues, or accessing professional development opportunities.304 This is 
the strategic nudge. However, the employee maintains control over whether 
to participate and sets conditions of disclosure with the disability identity 
escrow agent. Because the intermediary is a fiduciary of the employee, the 
identity escrow agent can work with the employee to set the trigger for 
disclosure. For example, Employee A says: “You may disclose to the employer 
if four other employees also participate and disclose.” The employee does not 
have to reveal (but may do so voluntarily) the specific diagnosis to participate 
and the employer cannot require medical documentation as a condition of 
participation. Assume employees B, C, and D have already deposited their 
disability identity in escrow and set the same trigger and conditions as A. The 
identity escrow agent then releases the information to the employer who 
allocates the funding to the affinity group. In terms of remedies, if the 
identity escrow agent breaches the duty of loyalty or care, an employee has 
standing to bring a tort action in state court. If the employee with a disability 
experiences discrimination because of their association with and membership 
in the affinity group, or other discrimination based on disability since the 
 
300 Id. at 159. 
301 Id. at 188-91. 
302 Id. at 160-61. 
303 Id. at 147. 
304 Another possibility is to use information escrow concepts more in line with Ayres and 
Unkovic by banking disability discrimination complaints or hostile work environment claims. 
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person disclosed, current antidiscrimination remedies would apply with 
potential amendments providing for litigation incentives.305 
3. Disability Law Reforms 
Data collection and choice architecture are front-end interventions to 
encourage greater visibility for those with less apparent disabilities. But we 
also need to think about back-end interventions, that is, when people do come 
out, what protections are in place sufficient to reduce costs on the front-end 
nudges discussed above? 
Here, we can consider potential reforms to disability laws that advance 
greater publicity of disability identity. I will offer milder and more intense 
interventions here. Consider the elimination of the disability definition in 
the ADA as a nudge. Rather than exerting resources on the litigation of 
whether someone has a legal disability, we might repeal that portion of the 
ADA and have plaintiffs address discrimination and causation from the start. 
That is, rather than have a person with a less visible disability expend time 
and money to secure an expert, complete the necessary forms, engage in the 
interactive process, we might decide that like race or gender, the adjudicative 
focus should be the substantive discrimination claim. 
If we eliminate the threshold question of whether the individual meets 
the disability definition, people may fear fraud. Questions about the nature 
of disability and extent of functional impairment will likely be addressed, in 
the employment context, for example, when pleading and proving the failure 
to provide a reasonable accommodation, improper discharge, or disparate 
impact. The benefit of eliminating this step is its signal to people with 
disabilities that personal claims to disability deserve a certain degree of 
deference to the individual disabled plaintiff. 
If we want to incentivize publicity, we might place a greater burden on 
the individual in the first instance to disclose disability more publicly. To do 
this, we need to develop a stronger antidiscrimination safety net to help 
capture potential discrimination after disclosure. We want to get to the point 
where people with disabilities no longer need the privacy protections in the 
ADA because our antidiscrimination efforts (both front- and back-end) are 
working effectively. However, until then, the risks and potential costs to 
individuals are great. To mitigate these risks, we should consider litigation 
benefits and procedural rule reforms that could help incentivize individuals 
and institutional actors to promote visibility. Consider, for example, a shift 
of the burden of proof, specifically the burden of persuasion: a plaintiff who 
comes out in the workplace and experiences an adverse employment action 
 
305 See supra Part II. 
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based on disability (or perceived as such) might show that she was public 
about her otherwise less apparent disability. This would be a low burden of 
persuasion where she might show that she wore a “Mad Pride” shirt 
celebrating neurodiversity and psychosocial disabilities during the employee 
summer outing. With this evidentiary showing, the burden might then shift 
to the employer to show that the alleged adverse employment action was not 
motivated by disability. 
CONCLUSION 
Disability law has a privacy problem. Taking disability public may appear 
counterintuitive, at least initially, but, as this Article has argued, maintaining 
existing privacy preferences in disability laws without interrogation and 
public debate is not costless. Specific prescriptions require public debate 
about the value of privacy and publicity in a given context, the stakes of 
disclosure and nondisclosure, and the role of the state in advancing publicity 
or privacy in those areas. In this sense, this Article opens the conversation by 
challenging an untested assumption and offering an analytical framework for 
analysis and discussion. After three decades and with such a significant public 
information deficit about the prevalence and diversity of capabilities under 
the umbrella of “people with disabilities,” we cannot afford to ignore this 
debate any longer. 
 
